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 Technological Tethereds: Potential 
Impact of Untrustworthy Artificial 
Intelligence in Criminal Justice Risk 
Assessment Instruments 
Sonia M. Gipson Rankin* 
Abstract 
Issues of racial inequality and violence are front and center 
today, as are issues surrounding artificial intelligence (“AI”). 
This Article, written by a law professor who is also a computer 
scientist, takes a deep dive into understanding how and why 
hacked and rogue AI creates unlawful and unfair outcomes, 
particularly for persons of color. 
Black Americans are disproportionally featured in criminal 
justice, and their stories are obfuscated. The seemingly endless 
back-to-back murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud 
Arbery, and heartbreakingly countless others have finally shaken 
the United States from its slumbering journey towards 
intentional criminal justice reform. Myths about Black crime 
and criminals are embedded in the data collected by AI and do 
not tell the truth about race and crime. However, the number of 
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Black people harmed by hacked and rogue AI will dwarf all 
historical records, and the gravity of harm is incomprehensible. 
The lack of technical transparency and legal accountability 
leaves wrongfully convicted defendants without legal remedies if 
they are unlawfully detained based on a cyberattack, faulty or 
hacked data, or rogue AI. Scholars and engineers acknowledge 
that the artificial intelligence that is giving recommendations to 
law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and parole boards lacks 
the common sense of an eighteen-month-old child. This Article 
reviews the ways AI is used in the legal system and the courts’ 
response to this use. It outlines the design schemes of proprietary 
risk assessment instruments used in the criminal justice system, 
outlines potential legal theories for victims, and provides 
recommendations for legal and technical remedies to victims of 
hacked data in criminal justice risk assessment instruments. It 
concludes that, with proper oversight, AI can increase fairness in 
the criminal justice system, but without this oversight, AI-based 
products will further exacerbate the extinguishment of liberty 
interests enshrined in the Constitution. 
According to anti-lynching advocate, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, 
“The way to right wrongs is to turn the light of truth upon them.” 
Thus, transparency is vital to safeguarding equity through AI 
design and must be the first step. The Article seeks ways to 
provide that transparency, for the benefit of all America, but 
particularly persons of color who are far more likely to be 
impacted by AI deficiencies. It also suggests legal reforms that 
will help plaintiffs recover when AI goes rogue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Jordan Peele’s 2019 widely praised film, Us, protagonist 
Adelaide meets her doppelgänger, who then proceeds to 
terrorize Adelaide’s family.1 This look-alike is described as her 
“Tether,” the product of a failed and disbanded United States 
government experiment, deemed harmless and left to remain 
below ground.2 The “Tethered” escape from their confinement 
intent on replacing the above-ground community.3 This film 
captures a growing tension in science and society of artificial 
intelligence (“AI”) today: what happens when AI does not 
operate as intended? Having AI serve as the foundation of risk 
assessment instruments, particularly in criminal justice allows 
instances of benign neglect, nefarious actors, and unintended 
consequences to change the outcomes in ways that harm 
society.4 In other words, AI is as likely to contribute to racism in 
the law as it is a means to end it. 
The courts have yet to address legal issues related to easily 
hackable AI. Further, the current remedies in place do not offer 
sufficient recourse for either wrongfully incarcerated 
defendants or harmed third parties. The criminal justice 
flowchart is well established. A defendant is arrested for a 
crime, granted or denied bail, convicted, and sentenced, 
sometimes with a possibility of being eligible for parole. AI has 
been used to augment every stage of the criminal justice 
 
 1. US (Universal Pictures 2019); see Tasha Robinson, Jordan Peele’s Us 
Turns a Political Statement into Unnerving Horror, VERGE (Mar. 22, 2019, 
10:47 AM), https://perma.cc/TK7F-RA6E. 
 2. See Tasha Robinson, Does the Ending of Jordan Peele’s Us Play Fair 
With the Audience?, VERGE (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://perma.cc/ALM7-
5K8M. 
 3. See id. This theme is also explored in the highly regarded Netflix 
series, Stranger Things. The “upside-down” reflects a distorted version of a 
small community where the corrupted inhabitants of the mirrored society 
cross blurred boundaries. See Ashley Strickland, The Weird Upside Down 
Science Behind ‘Stranger Things’, CNN (July 4, 2019, 9:55 AM), 
https://perma.cc/68F6-TAXJ. 
 4. See United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d 313, 344–46 (4th Cir. 2020) 
(Thacker, J., concurring) (emphasizing the potential for harm from predictive 
policing algorithms that may use data that reflects and reinforces racial 
biases). 
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decision-making process.5 Law enforcement uses facial 
recognition drones that report a high probability that the 
defendant has committed a crime.6 Using a pretrial risk 
assessment instrument, the prosecutor recommends to the court 
that the defendant not be eligible for bail because the software 
identifies the defendant as a flight risk or a danger to the 
community.7 The judge sentences the defendant after consulting 
a risk assessment instrument that gives a recommended 
sentence.8 The parole board consults another risk assessment 
instrument that computes its determination of the defendant’s 
release, parole, or probation.9 Without question, these issues 
disproportionately affect Black people, Indigenous people, and 
other communities of color. 
Black Americans are disproportionally featured in criminal 
justice, and their stories are obfuscated. The seemingly endless 
 
 5. From surveillance to pretrial sentencing to probation. For more on 
surveillance, see Molly Griffard, A Bias-Free Predictive Policing Tool?: An 
Evaluation of the NYPD’s Patternizr, 47 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 43, 44 (2019). For 
more on pretrial sentencing, see generally Brandon L. Garrett & John 
Monahan, Judging Risk, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2020). For more on probation, 
see Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2278 (2019); 
Cade Metz & Adam Satariano, An Algorithm That Grants Freedom, or Takes 
It Away, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/UV2Q-PK3S (last updated 
Feb. 7, 2020). 
 6. See Bobby Allyn, ‘The Computer Got It Wrong’: How Facial 
Recognition Led to False Arrest of Black Man, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 24, 2020, 
8:00 AM) (last updated June 24, 2020, 9:05 PM), https://perma.cc/Q2AS-9LP7 
(detailing the false arrest of a Black male following a faulty facial recognition 
match); Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Baltimore Hopes Surveillance Planes 
Lower Crime, but Residents Fear Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/N5FL-PPU7 (last updated June 3, 2020) (discussing the use 
of surveillance planes by the Baltimore Police Department). 
 7. See Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL 
2429574, at *1 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019) (summarizing a “data-based” risk 
assessment algorithm which provides quantitative scores and a 
“decision-making framework” to assist courts in “assess[ing] the risk that [a] 
criminal defendant will fail to appear for future court appearances or commit 
additional crimes and/or violent crimes if released”). 
 8. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 769 (Wis. 2016). 
 9. See Risk Assessment Landscape: Public Safety Risk Assessment 
Clearinghouse, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://perma.cc/98EA-QML3 
(providing an overview of the various risk assessment tools used across the 
country at different decision points in the criminal justice system). 
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back-to-back murders of George Floyd,10 Breonna Taylor,11 
Ahmaud Arbery,12 and heartbreakingly countless others have 
finally shaken the United States from its slumbering journey 
towards intentional criminal justice reform.13 The degradation 
of Black bodies at the hands of law enforcement and domestic 
terrorists has changed the narrative and halted many widely 
repeated tropes and excuses of “tough on crime” and 
“Black-on-Black crime” rhetoric.14 Myths are embedded in the 
data collected and do not tell the truth about race and crime in 
the United States.15 The number of Black people harmed by 
manipulated algorithms will dwarf all documented historical 
records, and the gravity of harm is incomprehensible. 
Imagine that a defendant has been convicted and sentenced 
using hacked software, at any point in the criminal justice 
process. In one scenario, the defendant receives a longer 
sentence than what would have been given but for the hacked 
software. In another, imagine the hacked software erred, 
recommending a lighter penalty, and the defendant injures a 
third party while released. Attacks on data are not only possible 
and probable but have indeed occurred; this can negatively 
 
 10. See Tim Arango et al., Footage of Police Body Cameras Offers 
Devastating Account of Floyd Killing, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/335P-B4XK (last updated Aug. 11, 2020). 
 11. See Rukmini Callimachi, Breonna Taylor’s Family Claims She Was 
Alive after Shooting but Given No Aid, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/DJE7-FGMR (last updated Sept. 23, 2020). 
 12. See Richard Fausset, Suspects in Ahmaud Arbery’s Killing Are 
Indicted on Murder Charges, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/GYT2-HR55 (last updated June 26, 2020). 
 13. See Michael Harriot, A Timeline of Events That Led to the 2020 ‘Fed 
Up’-rising, ROOT (May 30, 2020, 1:52 PM), https://perma.cc/B5ME-SBZ9. 
 14. See Hannah Allam, FBI Announces That Racist Violence Is Now 
Equal Priority to Foreign Terrorism, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 10, 2020, 4:17 
PM), https://perma.cc/LL6F-BACX (covering the announcement of the FBI 
that the agency made hate-fueled violence a top national security priority, on 
par with foreign terrorist groups). To understand how pervasive these tropes 
have been used, see generally Bernard D. Headley, “Black on Black” Crime: 
The Myth and the Reality, 20 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 50 (1983) and Evan Stark, 
The Myth of Black Violence, 38 SOC. WORK 485 (1993). 
 15. See Mayson, supra note 5, at 2227–49 (arguing that the inequality 
exposed by algorithmic risk assessment should “galvanize a more fundamental 
rethinking of the way in which the criminal justice system understands and 
responds to risk”). 
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impact the administration of justice.16 Inevitable questions 
arise: What are the legal accountability mechanisms available 
to address the unknowns of cyberattacks, falsified data, and the 
unintended consequences created by using unmonitored 
artificial intelligence? And, does the current rubric of 
“obstruction of justice,” with the fixed statute of limitations, 
provide enough of a deterrent for would-be bad actors? 
The implementation of AI in legal spaces has brought great 
promise. An array of legal scholars, scientists, and businesses 
believe that embedding AI into criminal justice reform can lead 
the United States to a more effective and efficient, bias-free 
system no longer centered on entrenched historical racism.17 
This Article is not a manifesto against tech and AI in the 
practice of law. Yet, without transparent safeguards to ensure 
that data sources have not been manipulated, criminal justice 
risk assessment instruments must not be used to administer 
justice. Additionally, this lack of oversight and transparency 
will have a disproportionate impact on Black people, people of 
color, and people with low socioeconomic status in the criminal 
justice system. 
Part I of this paper explains the ways AI architecture leaves 
itself vulnerable to attacks. It describes different cyberattacks 
such as malware, including computer viruses, worms, and 
botnets, and Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks. It also 
outlines the damage by cyberattacks, camouflaged and 
manipulated data sets, and the unintended outcomes produced 
by AI. All these and more are the ways that AI can be corrupted 
to change the integrity of the outcome and undermine a fair 
criminal justice system. Part II outlines the design schemes of 
two proprietary risk assessment instruments used in the 
 
 16. See infra Part III.A. 
 17. See generally Katheryn Russell-Brown, Racial Profiling: A Status 
Report of the Legal, Legislative, and Empirical Literature, 3 RUTGERS RACE & 
L. REV. 61 (2001); Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and 
the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63 (1993); Paul Butler, 
One Hundred Years of Race and Crime, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1043 
(2010); Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve & Lauren Mayes, Criminal Justice Through 
“Colorblind” Lenses: A Call to Examine the Mutual Constitution of Race and 
Criminal Justice, 40 L. & SOC. REV. 406 (2015); Naomi Murakawa & Katherine 
Beckett, The Penology of Racial Innocence: The Erasure of Racism in the Study 
and Practice of Punishment, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 695 (2010). 
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criminal justice system, Correctional Offender Management 
Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (“COMPAS”) and the Arnold 
Tool, and how they hinder justice. Part III documents potential 
legal theories of accountability and liability available to victims 
of hacked data in the criminal justice system. Part IV provides 
recommendations for legal and tech remedies to victims of 
hacked data in criminal justice risk assessment instruments. 
Finally, this Article concludes that vigilant oversight is 
necessary to ensure victims of hacked data are permitted 
recourse. 
I.  ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE CAN BE HACKED AND 
WEAPONIZED 
This Part provides technical background on data 
procurement and how AI depends on secure data. It also outlines 
a general background on cybersecurity, cyberattacks, and 
hacking, and how AI can be hacked and otherwise produce 
unexpected outcomes. An understanding of these matters 
contextualizes the flaws in the overreliance or blind reliance on 
data. 
A.  What Is Artificial Intelligence and How Is It Used? 
AI is used to make sense of data produced in the legal 
system, and the legal community must understand hacked data. 
Failure to do so renders the law unable to appreciate present 
and future threats from technology.18 Machine-learning 
algorithms have fundamentally transformed how life occurs, 
 
 18. As AI becomes more embedded in our shared legal lexicon, more 
clients will begin expecting attorneys to have strong competence in 
understanding this field. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2012) (requiring a competent lawyer to keep abreast of changes in 
the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated with 
relevant technology). Thirty-eight states have adopted the duty of technology 
competence in some form. See Robert Ambrogi, Tech Competence, LAWSITES, 
https://perma.cc/ZJ2C-JW7P (listing states that have formally adopted the 
duty of technology competence since the ABA formally approved the change to 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 2012). Florida has even required 
three out of thirty-three credit hours required every three years must be in 
approved technology programs. Mark D. Killian, Court Approves CLE Tech 
Component, FLA. BAR (Oct. 15, 2016), https://perma.cc/XCP8-A3EZ. 
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impacting hiring,19 access to health care,20 and criminal justice 
sentencing.21 AI is relevant to virtually any intellectual task, 
and, in the legal community alone, it has affected the practice 
and administration of law in many ways for the better. From the 
digitization of court proceedings to the automatic transcription 
of legal proceedings, there has been a world of innovation that 
has impacted and resulted in less administrative and repetitive 
and rote work in law practice.22 AI plays a role in more strategic 
legal tasks, including emotional intelligence, advanced 
problem-solving skills, and creative solutions for improvements 
to justice and new areas of ethical and legal conundrums.23 The 
potential benefit of using AI in the administration of justice is 
expansive, which ushers in an exciting period as the field 
evolves. 
At present, there is no straightforward way to define what 
AI means. Intelligence demonstrated by machines, in contrast 
to the natural intelligence displayed by humans, needs to be 
 
 19. See Miranda Bogen, All the Ways Hiring Algorithms Can Introduce 
Bias, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/4F6M-VRMZ (discussing 
whether hiring algorithms prevent bias or amplify it). 
 20. See Angela Spatharou et al., Transforming Healthcare with AI: The 
Impact on the Workforce and Organizations, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/6VHX-QV7J (noting AI’s transformative power on the 
delivery of health care). 
 21. See Judge Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in 
Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, AM. BAR ASS’N. (Jan. 1, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/8EJK-23A4 (noting concern with the judicial use of AI at 
sentencing to predict a criminal defendant’s risk of recidivism and encouraging 
courts to meet this technological development “with skepticism and close 
scrutiny”). 
 22. See Cary Coglianese & Lavi M. Ben Dor, AI in Adjudication and 
Administration, 85 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (“The principal 
advantages of artificial intelligence in the administrative context are similar 
to those in the private sector: accuracy and efficiency.”). 
 23. What will happen when autopilot arguments can be coded? In what 
ways will new branches of law and the development of case law and statutes 
affect or impact? What will improvements that have access to justice look like 
and feel like in society? These are questions that are raised every time 
innovation enters society and the law. See Garrett & Monahan, supra note 5, 
at 475–91 (detailing the rise of modern risk assessment AI and noting 
concern). 
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developed to meet society’s needs.24 In computer science, AI 
research is defined as the study of “intelligent agents,” i.e., any 
device that perceives its environment and takes actions that 
maximize its chance of successfully achieving its goals.25 These 
algorithmic processes are intended to rationalize 
decision-making by minimizing human bias and fallibility.26 
Simply put, AI is to capture not just what people think, but more 
importantly, how people should think. The implications run 
from philosophical to practical. As AI is a newer field in science, 
math, and engineering, there is no universal definition that 
defines the work, process, and product.27 AI is then any 
technique that authorizes the computer “to mimic human 
intelligence using logic, if-then rules, decision trees, and 
machine learning (including deep learning).”28 AI serves as a 
 
 24. Tech companies like Apple, Amazon, and Google have established 
themselves as users’ personal secretaries, using AI to guide us through the 
day, where we happily deposit our personal, confidential, and private items, 
such as calendars, photos, documents, and locations. See FRANKLIN FOER, 
WORLD WITHOUT MIND: THE EXISTENTIAL THREAT OF BIG TECH 2 (2017). 
 25. KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 11 (2016). 
 26. The architects of AI theorized that the brain itself was a computer, 
controlled by programs, something possible to replicate back into the machine, 
though the first ideas for algorithms arose from Gottfried Leibniz, in the late 
1600s. See FOER, supra note 24, at 36, 64. Google founders Larry Page’s and 
Sergey Brin’s plan was to create a brain that would not be influenced by 
human biases, untrustworthy sensory direction, and unexplainable desires 
that come from physical bodies. Id. at 38. The same will be true for Facebook. 
Id. at 64. 
 27. Algorithms can be challenging to define, and it is believed that 60 
percent of users are still entirely unaware it exists. FOER, supra note 24, at 73. 
Algorithms and the giant umbrella of tech innovations that have emerged in 
the last five years have and will continue to fundamentally alter the ways we 
connect, live, and work in the world. See SCHWAB, supra note 25, at vii. There 
is no universal definition, and it is currently being treated in the same way 
that people will use the term “Kleenex” to refer to all tissues or “Xerox” to refer 
to copying as a genericized trademark. See Christoph Henkel & Ruth C. 
Hauswirth, What Law Faculty Need to Know about Artificial Intelligence, 
ASS’N AM. L. SCHS. (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/FCE8-WX4W (noting that 
there are multiple subfields in addition to there being no universal definition 
of AI). 
 28. Roger Parloff, Why Deep Learning Is Suddenly Changing Your Life, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/Y643-A7BQ; see Meenal 
Dhande, What Is the Difference between AI, Machine Learning and Deep 
Learning?, GEOSPATIAL WORLD (July 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/F4N7-PUJD 
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universal term that is used to describe various 
machine-learning predictive technologies that can be applied to 
give users a window into large amounts of data, eliminate 
irrelevant information, and organize data for increased review, 
efficiency, and accuracy. 
Algorithms capture the process for solving a problem within 
a system, but neither give nor expect a proscribed correct, 
definitive answer. Algorithms define the process through which 
a decision is made, and AI uses that data to make decisions. AI 
has many more legal complexities.29 The AI can determine what 
data it thinks is the most valuable and reevaluate importance 
independent of the developer’s intent. Additionally, data is 
messy. If bad data is input, then the AI will produce inaccurate 
results. 
Since 2015, AI has become faster, less expensive, and more 
powerful.30 Because of infinite storage and seemingly unlimited 
minable data, there are infinite possibilities available through 
AI.31 Machine-learning (of which deep learning is a subset) is a 
type of AI that includes gives computers the ability to learn 
without being explicitly programmed.32 The machine-learning 
 
(articulating the interconnected nature of AI, machine-learning, and deep 
learning). 
 29. See Bridget Watson, A Mind of Its Own—Direct Infringement by Users 
of Artificial Intelligence Systems, 58 IDEA 65, 70 (2017) 
Part I discusses the evolution of artificial intelligence, the creative 
thinking capabilities of artificial intelligence systems, how direct 
infringement by an artificial intelligence system might occur, 
multiple parties involved in a single artificial intelligence system, 
and indemnification. 
 30. See Michael Copeland, What’s the Difference Between Artificial 
Intelligence, Machine Learning and Deep Learning?, NVIDIA (July 29, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/FM5J-MGQC (stating that the explosion of AI has a lot “to do 
with the wide availability of GPUs that make parallel processing ever faster, 
cheaper, and more powerful . . . [and] practically infinite storage and a flood of 
data”). 
 31. See id. 
 32. “Artificial intelligence” was used from the 1950s to the 1980s to 
describe the field. “Machine-learning” was used from the 1980s to the 2010s. 
“Deep learning” has been the best way to describe this work since then. See 
Bella Wilson, Major Milestones of Artificial Intelligence from 1949 to 2018, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/27DL-QZXK (listing the most 
important developments of AI, including the different terms used to refer to 
AI). 
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process defines a problem, prepares the data33 (separating 
training data from test data),34 trains the model,35 and finally 
deploys the machine-learning (watching for automation bias).36 
Deep learning is a type of machine-learning where the 
computer is trained to perform human-like tasks, such as image 
identification, recognizing speech, and making predictions.37 
However, instead of using predefined equations, deep learning 
sets up basic parameters about the data and trains the computer 
to learn independently.38 Deep learning is made up of 
algorithms that allow the software to teach itself to perform 
tasks by exposing multi-layered neural networks to copious 
amounts of data.39 One of the best examples of this is AlphaZero, 
where, in 2017, the computer was able to beat a chess master 
after learning the game in four hours.40 Open-source 
 
 33. See Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil 
Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and Justice, 
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 192, 192 (2019) (noting concern about the use of “dirty data” 
from corrupt, racially-biased, or unlawful police practices in algorithmic tools 
to support predictive policing). 
 34. See Cassandra Laskowski, AI Fundamentals for Faculty, ASS’N AM. L. 
SCHS. (July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/J9DC-V8DP (discussing the stages of 
machine-learning systems). 
 35. See Anup Bhande, What Is Underfitting and Overfitting in Machine 
Learning and How to Deal with It, MEDIUM (Mar. 11, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/96CL-3LA7 (explaining that how well a model fits to a data 
set determines whether the model will yield accurate results); Ali Svoboda, 
Applied Regression Analysis: Project 2, RPUBS (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2STZ-VYKK (experimenting with a dataset of information on 
houses to see if the house price could be explained by the square footage, age, 
and features of the home). 
 36. “Automation bias refers to a specific class of errors people tend to 
make in highly automated decision making contexts, when many decisions are 
handled by automated aids (e.g., computers), and the human actor is largely 
present to monitor on-going tasks.” Linda J. Skitka, Automation Bias, UNIV. 
ILL. CHI. (2011), https://perma.cc/JN4V-BP52. 
 37. See Deep Learning: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS, 
https://perma.cc/FH34-J5ZA. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Dhande, supra note 28 (explaining that deep learning “uses some 
machine learning techniques to solve real-world problems by tapping into 
neural networks that simulate human decision-making,” requiring huge 
datasets to train itself). 
 40. Coding a computer to play chess requires three components: the rules 
(bishop moves diagonally), strategies (castling), and a goal (claim the king). 
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machine-learning libraries like Sonnet, released by Google, 
makes it easier for developers to build neural network 
components.41 Another example of how deep learning works is 
examining the use of Google to have a translation agent that 
gives correction ideas. Google translation scans millions of books 
to look for patterns.42 Usually, “quick brown” is followed by “fox;” 
thus, the software looks for inferences from patterns in 
writing.43 For speech recognition, it had a 90 percent 
understanding rate.44 However, that means one in ten words 
was wrong. The computer had to process an algorithm that 
 
DeepMind, creators of AlphaZero, “said the difference between AlphaZero and 
its competitors is that its machine-learning approach is given no human input 
apart from the basic rules of chess. The rest works out by playing itself over 
and over with self-reinforced knowledge.” Samuel Gibbs, AlphaZero AI Beats 
Champion Chess Program after Teaching Itself in Four Hours, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
7, 2017, 7:41 AM), https://perma.cc/8BPK-PJUQ. AlphaZero was given no 
rules, strategies, or goals and had to learn them all by only playing the game. 
Id. DeepMind found that this approach made AlphaZero learn in a “more 
human-like approach,” searching for moves, processing around eighty 
thousand positions per second in chess. Id.; see David Silver et al., A General 
Reinforcement Learning Algorithm That Masters Chess, Shogi, and Go 
Through Self-Play, SCI. MAG. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/4UXH-WMBQ 
(detailing the achievements of the AlphaGo Zero program); see also FOER, 
supra note 24, at 52–53 (discussing deep learning’s potential to evolve to do 
everything). 
 41. See Mariya Yao, 12 Amazing Deep Learning Breakthroughs of 2017, 
FORBES (Feb. 5, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/4U88-VMFM (reflecting on 
the deep learning breakthroughs of 2017—”The Year of AI”). 
 42. See Quoc V. Le et al., A Neural Network for Machine Translation, at 
Production Scale, GOOGLE AI BLOG (Sept. 27, 2016), https://perma.cc/SHJ7-
HRCE (announcing the Google Neural Machine Translation system, which 
“utilizes state-of-the-art training techniques to achieve the largest 
improvements to date for machine translation quality”). 
 43. See Tianyi Zhao, The AI Powers behind Google Translate, GEO. 
(May 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/5A7Q-SNDV (discussing Google Translate’s 
automated recognition of patterns and regularities in data); Gideon 
Lewis-Kraus, The Great A.I. Awakening, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/2NTF-UZED (explaining Google Translate’s ability to rewire 
itself to reflect patterns from the data it absorbs). 
 44. See Mike Wheatley, Google Makes Its Speech-to-Text and 
Text-to-Speech Services More Accurate and Accessible, SILICONANGLE (Feb. 
21, 2019), https://perma.cc/DL3V-2ZLT. 
660 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2021) 
 
sorted the words.45 This self-directed trial-and-error process is 
deep learning. Applied data science, computer science, and 
high-tech investment are moving in this direction of such 
results.46 
AI is a tool, but it can also be used as a weapon. A 
multifaceted document, The Malicious Use of Artificial 
Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation, is a 2018 
report crafted by fourteen institutions from academia, civil 
society, and industry.47 The report outlined the economic, 
political, and human labor expenses related to malicious 
attacks, new attacks, and changes to the type of character of 
threats.48 Similarly, in their article, “How A.I. Could Be 
Weaponized to Spread Disinformation,” Cade Metz and Scott 
Blumenthal described how weaponized AI could be used to 
spread disinformation.49 Another author, Jayshree Pandya, in 
“The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence,” addressed how AI 
could be weaponized in cyberwar.50 Misunderstanding the 
mathematics of high-dimensional spaces may lead users to false 
confidence in the ability of deep neural networks to make the 
right decisions.51 
 
 45. See Isaac Caswell & Bowen Liang, Recent Advances in Google 
Translate, GOOGLE AI BLOG (June 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/F6EN-WAMU 
(discussing further advancements in the AI behind Google Translate). 
 46. See Kevin J. Ryan, Who’s Smartest: Alexa, Siri, and or Google Now?, 
INC. (June 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/GA4K-EMK2. 
 47. MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION (2018), 
https://perma.cc/8Y3T-SVUS (PDF). 
 48. Id. They make four high-level recommendations related to 
policymaking, reach out to necessary parties about foreseeable harm, identify 
best practices, and expand stakeholders and domain experts into the 
conversation. See id. at 31 (noting AI is “already being deployed for purposes 
such as anomaly and malware detection”). 
 49. Cade Metz & Scott Blumenthal, How A.I. Could Be Weaponized to 
Spread Disinformation, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/3FCM-
8W6L. 
 50. Jayshree Pandya, The Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence, 
FORBES (Jan. 14, 2019, 12:51 AM), https://perma.cc/V7ZG-8673. 
 51. Some other issues include the fact that it can be difficult for networks 
to converge, and that GANs have yet to converge on large problems. See 
Jonathan Hui, GAN—Why It Is So Hard to Train Generative Adversarial 
Networks!, MEDIUM (June 21, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6WC-KSF7 (explaining 
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B.  How Data Is Gathered, Analyzed, and Utilized 
The top three spaces where attacks occur are through Big 
Data,52 the Internet of Things (“IoT”),53 and AI, all of which 
compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability.54 These 
three attack surfaces comprise the primary ways data is 
gathered, disseminated, and utilized.55 
Big Data describes types of data and is an attack surface by 
hackers. Big Data’s value comes from four parts: capture, 
storage, analysis, and action.56 In creating Big Data, there are 
distinct ways that data is procured, and tech companies have 
become the biggest gatekeepers of data. For example, Google 
provides a hierarchy to information; Facebook uses algorithms 
to organize social circles; Amazon watches users’ purchasing 
and browsing patterns to recommend further acquisitions.57 
Sets of Big Data are gathered, continually, to be used in AI.58 
The amount of discoverable data is astronomical. The volume of 
Big Data continues to expand, with 2.4 quintillion new bits of 
data being created daily.59 It is anticipated that there would be 
44 trillion gigabytes by 2020,60 including the capture of every 
red light camera video, Fitbit daily steps, meal trackers, grocery 
 
the difficulty in creating and training generative adversarial networks, which 
create data as opposed to discriminative models which process data). 
 52. See Laurel Eckhouse, Opinion, Big Data May Be Reinforcing Racial 
Bias in the Criminal Justice System, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/WQ72-5G2P. 
 53. The Internet of Things is defined as the connection via the internet of 
all computing devices that transmits and receives data. Eric Brown, Who 
Needs the Internet of Things, LINUX.COM (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/SP3M-95XG. 
 54. See Artificial Intelligence and Robotics National Institute, AM. BAR 
ASS’N 469 (2020), https://perma.cc/Q5AD-932N (PDF) (noting the cyber risks 
in today’s complex world of tech to the Big Data, Internet of Things, and AI). 
 55. See id. (listing the three primary attack surfaces). 
 56. See Why Big Data Is “The New Natural Resource”, WASH. POST, 
https://perma.cc/4YLL-2UV4 [hereinafter The New Natural Resource]. 
 57. See FOER, supra note 24, at 4–5. One-third of Amazon purchases come 
from recommendations. Id. at 70. Facebook uses upwards of one hundred 
thousand “signals” when determining data that a user will see. Id. at 73. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See The New Natural Resource, supra note 56. 
 60. See id. 
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orders, and podcasts consumed by persons across the world.61 
There is a difference between found data sets and created data 
sets. For example, a found data set would be basketball 
statistics, street mapping, traffic data and vehicle locations, and 
additionally, data from wearable internet which provide 
biomedical data from wearable internet such as fitness trackers 
and smartphones.62 IoT shares house temperatures and air 
quality.63 And even legal decisions have joined the world of data 
points. Through the Caselaw Access Project, all cases in United 
States history have been digitized and made public and widely 
available.64 Each case, date, defendant, and jurisdiction is a data 
 
 61. See id. Smart devices, social media, cameras, and sensors will feed 
the Internet of Things and prepare for harvesting. See id. 
 62. Secure locations at military centers were compromised because of 
people wearing their Fitbit trackers. Fitness App Strava Lights Up Staff at 
Military Bases, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/5MQH-3GYN. 
 63. JunHo Jo et al., Development of an IoT-Based Indoor Air Quality 
Monitoring Platform, 2020 J. SENSORS 1, 2, https://perma.cc/2DHG-42BR 
(PDF). 
 64. See Gallery, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/9HHE-85P9 
(including only some of what has been digitized). In 2018, the Harvard Law 
School Library announced its forthcoming project: Caselaw Access Project 
(CAP) API that published all United States case law for anyone to access for 
no cost. About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/AGC4-N8LC. 
Between 2013 and 2018, the library digitized forty million pages of United 
States court decisions, encompassing almost 6.5 million individual cases. Id. 
The digitization of 6.5 million cases for the CAP was an audacious undertaking 
and a true marvel. Id. The database purports to have gathered every case from 
1658 until 2018, telling the legal story of the United States. Id. It tells our 
legal ancestry and provides the “legal genome” path of whom we are and how 
we got there through the law. Id. The creation of the database was a huge 
undertaking and will fundamentally influence the understanding of patterns 
and predictability of cases by jurisdiction, state, and across the nation. Our 
ability to interpret evidence of bias in judicial decisions will be simple to 
discern after reviewing and parsing the information based on the information 
presented. Not only is this audacious collection based on time, but it is also 
impressive based on breadth. The collection includes all state, federal, tribal, 
and territorial courts, including American Samoa, Dakota Territory, Guam, 
Tribal Courts, and the Northern Mariana Islands. Id. Not only is the breadth 
broad, but the level of detail included is extensive. Each volume is broken down 
to the case-level to include majority and dissenting opinions, with humans 
reviewing the data for party names, docket numbers, and dates. Id. This 
human-verification process will be vital as we review recent hacks that have 
been able to fool AI systems. This project’s full potential is still being 
explored/investigated, as users have created Wordclouds, limerick generators, 
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point for exploration and extrapolation.65 However, found data 
does not always tell the full story. One can have incorrect 
labels66 or missing or incorrect data.67 
Created data, on the other hand, consists of data sets from 
synthesized sources made to mimic real data that can serve as 
a “sandbox” for developers to make created data.68 Examples of 
created data would be Instagram filters that put sunglasses on 
a face or epidemiology models about the distribution of a 
vaccine.69 The assumption that test data will be generally 
similar to the training data has created its own subfield, 
Generative Adversarial Networks (“GANs”).70 Algorithms 
capture the process for solving a problem within a system, but 
neither give nor expect a proscribed correct, final answer.71 
GANs are created when two neural networks train concurrently 
to understand that one can serve as a foundation to generate 
 
open-source casebooks, and models to teach people how to write in Python. 
Gallery, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, https://perma.cc/9HHE-85P9. 
 65. See About, CASELAW ACCESS PROJECT, supra note 64 (listing key 
metadata fields within the digitization process). 
 66. CLARENCE CHIO & DAVID FREEMAN, MACHINE LEARNING & SECURITY: 
PROTECTING SYSTEMS WITH DATA AND ALGORITHMS 279 (Courtney Allen ed., 
2018) (“This bias causes imperfect data and incorrect labels assigned to 
samples, affecting the accuracy of the system.”). 
 67. See id. at 280; see also Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm 
Contribute To This San Francisco Man’s Murder?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 18, 
2017), https://perma.cc/H2UK-V8P2 (“Judge Reardon followed the 
recommendation of . . . a computer-generated score that’s used . . . to help 
calculate whether a suspect is a flight risk or likely to return to court. . . . In 
the case of French, a miscalculation ended in murder.”). 
 68. See Cody Nash, Create Data from Random Noise with Generative 
Adversarial Networks, DEVELOPERS, https://perma.cc/U296-S4JE (explaining 
how a GAN-Sandbox is used to generate new credit card data). 
 69. See Lucas Matney, Instagram’s AR Filters Are Getting More Dynamic, 
TECHCRUNCH (May 27, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://perma.cc/6QEQ-RZGD 
(discussing the AR that creates Instagram filters). 
 70. See generally W. Philip Kegelmeyer, Adversarial Issues in Machine 
Learning, in 22 NEXT WAVE 10 (2019), https://perma.cc/AAV6-U9B8 (PDF). For 
additional ideas on the role of Generative Adversarial Networks, see generally 
Steven M. Bellovin et al., Privacy and Synthetic Datasets, 22 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1 (2019); Russell Spivak, Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest Crimes, 
3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339 (2019). 
 71. See FOER, supra note 24, at 67–69. 
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possible outcomes for veracity and probability of occurrence.72 
Every day, GANs are improving effectiveness at producing 
realistic-looking synthetic samples, though they are unable to 
infer, which remains a complex human trait.73 The GAN model 
has shown substantial promise, but the existing errors are 
significant.74 The samples produced are quite convincing, but 
mistakes can include color, style, and in extreme instances, 
object identity.75 There are also structural flaws with this model 
of developing training sets. The discriminator becomes too 
strong too quickly, and the generator ends up not learning 
anything.76 Or the generator only learns the particular 
weaknesses of the discriminator, and it can take advantage of 
these to trick the discriminator into classifying generated data 
as real instead of learning to represent the actual data 
distribution.77 The generator can also learn only a minimal 
subset of the actual data distribution, leading to insufficient 
variation in the output.78 
AI is designed to learn from training sets made of found 
data and created data.79 Training sets are acquired from every 
 
 72. See Barry Chen et al., Toward a Deep Learning System for Making 
Sense of Unlabeled Multimodal Data, in 22 NEXT WAVE 1, 4 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/AAV6-U9B8 (PDF) (“In GANs, two networks compete against 
each other: The first one learns features effective for generating input data 
realistic enough to fool the second one.”). 
 73. See Vincent Dumoulin, Adversarially Learned Inference, GITHUB, 
https://perma.cc/BH2T-LDY9. 
 74. See id. (including photographs to visualize the inaccuracies). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Animesh Karnewar, V-GAN (Variational Discriminator 
Bottleneck): An Unfair Fight between Generator and Discriminator, MEDIUM 
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/2A7L-2HKX (discussing the problem with a 
discriminator becoming too powerful). The discriminator classifies generated 
data as fake so accurately and confidently that there is nothing in the 
discriminator’s back-propagated loss function gradients for the generator to 
learn. See id. 
 77. See id. (“Generally, if the Discriminator becomes too strong, i.e. it can 
easily tell the samples apart, it would cease to supply plausible gradients to 
the Generator for training.”). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Alex Moltzau, Artificial Intelligence and Training Data, TOWARDS 
DATA SCI. (Oct. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/GK7E-UTTX (“The data used to 
build the final model usually comes from multiple datasets.”). 
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camera, scanner, and device available.80 Microsoft, Stanford, 
and Duke have quietly deleted public face recognition data 
sets.81 Over ten million images of one hundred thousand 
individuals who had not been asked for nor given their consent 
have been removed.82 Although Microsoft has deleted the 
database, it is still available to researchers and companies that 
had previously downloaded it and this data is still being shared 
on open source websites.83 Sometimes, there is data that is not 
meant to be included in AI calculations. The Pentagon has had 
to remind military troops and defense personnel that in their 
quest to reach their daily “10,000” steps via their fitness 
trackers, they were inadvertently transmitting sensitive and 
secure locations to a third party.84 
There are many compelling reasons to be pleased with the 
collection of data, and people have benefited from data sharing 
across systems through IoT. The productivity increases, 
quantifiable improvements in quality of life, and lowering costs 
of regular goods and services provide comfort and excitement 
 
 80. When Google began its process of digitizing all books, it would arrive 
at libraries, trucking away boxes of books and quickly scanning and returning 
them. FOER, supra note 24, at 54. “We are not scanning all those books to be 
read by people. We are scanning them to be read by an AI.” Id. at 55 (quoting 
an unnamed Google engineer). 
 81. See Madhumita Murgia, Microsoft Quietly Deletes Largest Public Face 
Recognition Data Set, FIN. TIMES (June 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/T2Z2-S78B 
(explaining that Microsoft, Duke, and Stanford data sets were taken down 
after a Financial Times report). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
Now it is completely disassociated from any licensing, rules or 
controls that Microsoft previously had over it. People are posting it 
on GitHub, hosting the files on Dropbox and Baidu Cloud, so there 
is no way from stopping them from continuing to post it and use it 
for their own purposes. 
(quoting Alan Harvey). 
 84. A twenty-year-old Australian student discovered two years’ worth of 
data uploaded by Strava, a social media platform for athletes with 
satellite-tracking data for digital fitness devices such as Fitbit. David Martin, 
Pentagon Reviews Fitness Tracker Use over Security Concerns, CBS NEWS 
(Jan. 29, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://perma.cc/4LAR-7XH5. The tracking outlined 
military bases and secure sites across the country and mapped their travel 
patterns by time and location. Id. 
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about the future.85 With the anticipated trillions of devices such 
as smartphones, wearable devices, computers, and tablets, 
generating further trillions of data points, the assistance and 
surveillance, and ownership of the data will continue to be called 
into question.86 While there are many positive applications 
associated with enjoying a digital presence,87 those positive 
applications do not outweigh the real and concerning threats of 
privacy, surveillance, and stolen information being used to 
create training sets without the user’s permission.88 And attacks 
can occur between interconnected devices. A user may be 
comfortable with the data being used to recommend better 
running trails, but not to determine if one’s insurance company 
will dictate a minimum number of steps required to be eligible 
for health insurance.89 And users may not appreciate that a 
breach of an individual’s streaming service can lead to entry to 
a person’s home security system.90 
C.  Public Fears and the Reality of Concerns Related to AI 
Doubts about AI are growing. In 2019, the American Bar 
Association featured an article penned by Judge Nel L. Hillman 
titled “The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of 
Recidivism.”91 The article outlined three reasons for concern 
 
 85. See SCHWAB, supra note 25, at 137 (listing the positive impacts of IoT). 
 86. See id. at 18. It is anticipated that by 2025, there will be one trillion 
sensors connected to the internet. Id. at 26. 
 87. Such as an increase in transparency, faster interconnectivity between 
persons and systems, more space for free speech, faster dissemination of 
information, and more efficient use of government systems and resources. See 
id. at 123 (listing the positive impacts of digital presence). 
 88. See Jathan Sadowski, Companies Are Making Money from Our 
Personal Data—but at What Cost?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/8ZX9-ZZAR (commenting that the methods and purposes of 
data collection range from irritating infringements to major intrusions). 
 89. See Angela Chen, What Happens When Life Insurance Companies 
Track Fitness Data?, VERGE (Sept. 26, 2018, 1:01 PM), https://perma.cc/ZT43-
GCTJ (considering the privacy concerns involved with insurance policies that 
allow customers to share fitness data in exchange for discounts). 
 90. See Marc Wilczek, Cybercrime: AI’s Growing Threat, DARK READING 
(Oct. 4, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://perma.cc/MZ4G-7FK7 (outlining ways IoT can 
be hacked). 
 91. Hillman, supra note 21. 
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related to AI in the sentencing process: potential violations of 
due process, the limitations of AI related to unacceptable risks 
of error and implicit bias, and lastly, that “reliance on AI to 
predict recidivism improperly cedes the discretionary 
sentencing power to nonjudicial entities.”92 Judge Hillman is 
correct on the pulse of significant concerns about the use of AI 
in the sentencing process. One of the areas that is receiving the 
least attention is how unstable AI is as a developing science, 
particularly as it relates to security and the potential for 
hacking related to the input data and the produced output 
data.93 
In a 2017 Pew Research survey poll, 72 percent of U.S. 
adults reported they were worried that robots and computers 
would do human jobs.94 Those adults reported being three times 
more likely to feel worried as compared to enthusiasm about the 
role of algorithms in making hiring decisions without human 
involvement.95 In the same survey, people were decidedly 
reluctant to incorporate unique AI practices into their lives.96 
Nevertheless, AI decision-making is happening in every aspect 
of people’s lives, without proper vetting.97 Cybersecurity is 
consistently treated as an afterthought instead of being 
integrated into protocols and principles from the initial design 
stage.98 Furthermore, the question is not whether an AI 
cyberattack has happened yet, but what is the unknown impact 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. (acknowledging that states only recently introduced AI tools 
in sentencing). 
 94. Compared to 33 percent that were enthusiastic. Monica Anderson, 6 
Key Findings on How Americans See the Rise of Automation, PEW RSCH. CTR. 
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/3UFC-SU63. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (“[A]round six-in-ten U.S. adults say they would not want to ride 
in a driverless car (56%) or have a robot caregiver for themselves or a family 
member (59%).”). 
 97. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Barbara Burgess, Businesses Consider Cybersecurity as an 
Afterthought despite Growth in Attacks, EY Survey Finds, EY (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/8NDZ-BULY (“Despite the overall growth in cyberattacks, 
only one-third of organizations say the cybersecurity function is involved at 
the planning stage of a new business initiative . . . .”). 
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of the cyberattack that has likely already occurred.99 This Part 
further describes types of cyberattacks, how data is hacked, and 
what happens when AI is not monitored for bias. 
1.  Cyberattacks 
Cybersecurity and privacy are areas of concern in AI 
development. Over the last seventy-five years, scientists have 
been watching and defending against cybersecurity attacks.100 
The experts warn that it is not a matter of “if” but rather “when” 
we can anticipate, future breaches and hacks to the software.101 
Hacking is the act of someone or something gaining 
unauthorized access to a computer device or even an 
algorithm.102 Hacking finds weaknesses in the security settings, 
exploiting them to access confidential information to inject 
 
 99. See Wilczek, supra note 90. 
 100. In 1943, Alan Turing, the “father of Computer Science” led the British 
effort that developed the first digital machine that could hack German codes, 
known as the “Enigma” code. See Glenn Zorpette, Breaking the Enemy’s Code: 
British Intelligence Deciphered Germany’s Top-Secret Military 
Communications with Colossus, an Early Vacuum-Tube Computer, 24 IEEE 
SPECTRUM 47, 47–51 (1987). In 1982, the United States staged a prototype 
where they reprogrammed computer equipment intended for a Soviet gas 
pipeline that caused the pipeline to explode. See RICHARD M. NEPHEW, 
TRANSATLANTIC SANCTIONS POLICY: FROM THE 1982 SOVIET GAS PIPELINE 
EPISODE TO TODAY 1 (2019), https://perma.cc/89QL-J2ET (PDF). In 1988, the 
first worm was distributed by the Internet and released in November of that 
year. See Sihan Qing & Weiping Wen, A Survey and Trends on Internet Worms, 
24 COMPUTS. & SEC. 334 (2005), https://perma.cc/2GPH-XC6F. In 1999, 
Melissa—the first widespread email worm—and Kak were created and 
deployed. See Nick G., The Most Telling Cyber Security Statistics in 2020 
[Infographic], TECHJURY, https://perma.cc/ZZ9H-NYZL (last updated Aug. 20, 
2020) [hereinafter Cyber Sec Statistics]. In 2003, the Department of Homeland 
security began operations creating the national cybersecurity division, and by 
2006, NASA had been forced to block emails with attachments before shuttles 
were launched out of fear of potential hacking schemes. Id. In 2009, the Aurora 
attack hit Google and thirty-three other companies in search of intellectual 
property and 2010, the Stuxnet attack was uncovered. Id. This was considered 
the first weaponized malware because of its targeted purposely targeted 
nature and the fact that it is disrupted Iran’s nuclear program and the 
centrifuges used for uranium enrichment. Id. 
 101. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100 (“Cyber security statistics 
show that this field will only continue to grow commensurately with the 
demand. Hackers and cyber criminals aren’t slowing down . . . .”). 
 102. See id. 
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harmful data or applications.103 Between January 2006 and 
April 2018, there were over eight thousand recorded breaches in 
identity theft resource centers.104 Fifty million Facebook 
accounts were affected by an attack in September 2018 and bar 
exam students have even found their bar exams hacked.105 
There are a plethora of types of cyberattacks,106 and AI has 
changed the design and broadened the scope of cyberattacks.107 
Malware is defined as malicious software that infects a 
computer, and this will include computer viruses, worms, Trojan 
horses, spyware, and adware.108 Malware aids hackers to gain 
control over the targeted computer or devices to perform forced 
 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., https://perma.cc/NE2R-
AFNP (including data breach reports from 2005 to present). 
 105. See Mike Isaac & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Security Breach Exposes 
Accounts of 50 Million Users, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/JB7G-LDED (explaining the ramifications of the breach); 
David Jesse, Michigan Online Bar Exam Crashes in Middle of Testing; 
Hacking Attempt Blamed, DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 28, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/3GQ3-UYEX (reporting the ramifications of Michigan’s 
hacked bar exam); Chris Opfer, Florida Scraps Online Bar Exam, Citing 
Technology Concerns, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 17, 2020, 8:39 AM), 
https://perma.cc/EC64-PWTW (referring to the hacking of Michigan’s exam). 
 106. They can also include phishing, ransomware, pharming, viruses, 
Wi-Fi eavesdropping, and industrial IoT attacks. Types of Cyber Threats and 
What They Do, TIE NAT’L (Jan. 24, 2017), https://perma.cc/5U7N-EC4Q. 
Ransomware attacks have stymied many local governments throughout the 
United State in recent years. Ransomware attacks in Atlanta, Georgia in 2018, 
Baltimore, Maryland in 2019, and Greenville, North Carolina in 2020, 
removed critical access to data for weeks and cost the cities hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to restore and protect the systems. See Alan Blinder & 
Nicole Perlroth, A Cyberattack Hobbles Atlanta, and Security Experts 
Shudder, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/B3WK-KFAA; Sean 
Gallagher, Baltimore Ransomware Nightmare Could Last Weeks More, with 
Big Consequences, ARS TECHNICA (May 20, 2019, 12:47 PM), 
https://perma.cc/GSZ6-JPLA; Genna Contino, Greenville Water Phone, Online 
Payment Systems Restored, GREENVILLE NEWS (Feb. 4, 2020, 10:30 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8AVT-EB7N. 
 107. See generally William Dixon & Nicole Eagan, 3 Ways AI Will Change 
the Nature of Cyber Attacks, WORLD ECON. F. (June 13, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/GF8M-3C7M (pointing to attacks such as impersonation of 
trusted users, attacks in the background, and faster attacks with more 
effective consequences). 
 108. See What Is the Difference: Viruses, Worms, Trojans, and Bots?, CISCO 
(June 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/L63E-8RBT. 
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actions and access unauthorized data.109 Unlike a virus, worms 
live autonomously in the computer’s memory; they do not 
damage nor alter the hard drive, but instead send themselves to 
other machines in the network, causing damage by shutting 
down parts of the network.110 Botnets create an army of infected 
computers that act under a hacker’s control, and these infected 
units often function in a way that makes the attack 
undetectable.111 Bots are mostly discussed in the media in the 
context of spreading false information, but bots are also used to 
attack computers and networks.112 They can send spam emails, 
spread malware, or have Distributed Denial-of-Service attacks 
(DDoS).113 In a DDoS attack, a botnet army keeps attacking a 
web server, causing it to fail because of an overload, forcing the 
web servers to shut down.114 
 
 109. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100. A solid 99.9 percent of 
discovered mobile malware was hosted on third party app stores. Id. An app 
store is a type of digital distribution platform for computer software called 
applications, often in a mobile context, and two of the most popular ones are 
Google Play Store and Apple App Store. See J. Clement, Number of Apps 
Available in Leading App Stores 2020, STATISTA (Nov. 24, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/L38L-AEFY (providing a chart showing the biggest app 
stores). 
 110. See John Markoff, Worm Infects Millions of Computers Worldwide, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2009), https://perma.cc/U93M-LJSK. In 2009, a worm 
called Downadup infected almost nine million computers in fourteen days. See 
id. 
 111. See Botnet DDoS Attacks, IMPERVA, https://perma.cc/8SY2-EF7N 
(explaining what a botnet is). The number of Windows botnets rose from 29 
percent to 34 percent in the first quarter of 2018. Alison DeNisco Rayome, 
Major DDoS Attack Lasts 297 Hours, as Botnets Bombard Businesses, 
TECHREPUBLIC (Apr. 27, 2018, 5:48 AM), https://perma.cc/97B6-EEHS. 
 112. See Sam Bocetta, Has an AI Cyber Attack Happened Yet?, INFOQ 
(Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/5Y3F-R6G9 (“These bots can pretty easily be 
used for misinformation, like when users marshal them to flood a Twitter 
thread with false posters to influence an argument. But they can be used to 
DDos the computers and networks of an enemy.”). 
 113. See Rayome, supra note 111. 
 114. What Is a DDoS Attack?, SUCURI (Aug. 9, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/D8EJ-3LN5. 
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Cyberattacks in 2019 and 2020 were rampant.115 Most 
companies are unaware of internal and external attacks.116 
Experts believe it takes half a year to detect a data breach and 
that almost half of all cyberattacks are aimed at small 
businesses, with 91 percent of attacks launched with a phishing 
email.117 Every fourteen seconds, a business operation falls 
victim to a ransomware attack,118 and 38 percent of malicious 
attachments are masked and hidden as Microsoft Office types of 
files.119 In 2016, cybercriminals exploited 48 percent of U.S. 
citizens’ credit cards, and the global cost of online crime is 
anticipated to be $6 trillion by 2021.120 In the same way, 62 
percent of global organizations have admitted that they are not 
equipped to handle a cyberattack.121 Between January and 
September 2019, 7.9 billion data records became vulnerable to 
data breaches.122 Additionally, undetected software bugs are 
another way systems are vulnerable to attack. For example, on 
January 29, 2019, it was discovered that an iPhone FaceTime 
 
 115. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100 (“IoT attacks were up by 600 
percent in 2017. In 2019, the attacks reached 2.9 billion events.”). In the first 
half of 2020, thirty-six billion records were exposed, surpassing the total 
number of records exposed for all of 2019 by a factor of two. See RISKBASED 
SECURITY, 2020 Q3 REPORT: DATA BREAK QUICKVIEW 10 (2020), 
https://perma.cc/W74U-7WAK (PDF). 
 116. See id. (“Perhaps the more concerning side to cyber security statistics, 
in general is the number of incidents that have gone unreported. Speculation 
would lead one to believe that the figure of 31% is significantly lower than 
reality.”). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. Experts studying breaches in 2020 found that 84 percent were 
financially motivated. See VERIZON, 2020 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS 
REPORT 10 (2020), https://perma.cc/6K3A-LXAY (PDF). 
 120. See Steve Morgan, Cybercrime to Cost the World $10.5 Trillion 
Annually by 2025, CYBERCRIME MAG. (Nov. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/XNM2-
K4WL. Some experts see damages related to cyberattacks are expected to 
exceed $5 trillion by 2024. Wilczek, supra note 90. Thirty-one percent of 
organizations had experienced a cyberattack at the operational infrastructure 
level, and the most concerning point is that a number of these incidents have 
gone unreported. Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100. 
 121. See Cyber Sec Statistics, supra note 100. 
 122. See INGA GODDIJN & JAKE KOUNS, DATA BREACH QUICKVIEW REPORT 
(2019), https://perma.cc/B9CU-FMJL (PDF). 
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bug would allow a person to eavesdrop on any iPhone user.123 
One attack against Instagram locked users out of their social 
profiles in August 2019,124 and a bug in the code led to a data 
breach in November 2019.125 AI cyberattacks are on the rise 
because of vulnerable storage services and an increase in data 
that people give to companies that are then sold to third-party 
companies.126 These are examples of types of attacks that have 
been reported; however, because of companies’ private nature, it 
is not clear how many companies, software distributors, and 
organizations have had data breaches. 
Attacks against government entities are particularly 
pernicious as they directly impact a necessary part of people’s 
daily lives in the United States. A reported 7.3 percent of data 
breaches in the United States, from 2014 to 2018, occurred on 
government or military entities.127 For instance, a recent attack 
in April 2018, where 3.75 million Social Security numbers and 
bank account details were data-mined,128 can lead to public 
 
 123. A major new bug was introduced in iOS 12.1 that allowed anyone to 
FaceTime groups to listen in on the audio and potentially YouTube video of 
anyone else using iOS. It worked ranging from new iPhone XS to iPhone 5S, 
as long as it was using iOS 12.1 and above. See Jake Swearingen, Major iPhone 
FaceTime Bug Lets You Eavesdrop on Any iPhone User, INTELLIGENCER (Jan. 
28, 2019), https://perma.cc/WXT9-5YPT (explaining the details of the 
FaceTime bug). Apple anticipated needing a week to fix the bug, advising users 
to disable FaceTime on their phones. However, they quickly changed this 
policy and disabled group FaceTime from the system level. See Tom Warren, 
Apple Disables Group FaceTime Following Major Security Flaw, VERGE (Jan. 
29, 2019, 12:04 AM), https://perma.cc/3N2C-PRRX. 
 124. See Bocetta, supra note 112. 
 125. See id.; Sarah Kuranda & Reed Albergotti, New Instagram Bug Raises 
Security Questions, INFO. (Nov. 16, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://perma.cc/BR3F-
ZLJQ (probing the dangers of Instagram’s recent security flaw). 
 126. See Bocetta, supra note 112 (“[E]veryday people are giving more data 
to companies than ever before, particularly through device or app usage or 
through subscription services.”). 
 127. See EXPERIAN, DATA BREACH RESPONSE GUIDE 4 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/K9V5-TZ93 (PDF) (reporting that 46.3 percent of breaches 
were through business, 27.1 percent in medical and health care industries, 
12.6 percent in banking and credit financial industries, and 6.7 percent in 
education). 
 128. See Rex Hammock, Taskrabbit, IKEA’s Gig-Economy Home Service 
Marketplace, Gets Hit by Hackers, SMALLBUSINESS.COM (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/6F5D-QXUP. The attack was made by a botnet that used 
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mistrust in the government’s ability to safeguard private data. 
While it may be encouraging that it is not a more significant 
percentage of identified data breaches, the very governmental 
entity responsible for securing people’s data is in reality denying 
people of their liberty interest, particularly as it relates to 
incarceration. Hackers can develop machine algorithm hacking 
methods effortlessly or use botnets to spread an attack.129 The 
scope of the impact of hacked AI is unquantifiable.130 Also, every 
time a bot system makes an attack, it becomes better when it 
attempts to attack again.131 
These pale in comparison to the largest cyberattack against 
the United States federal agencies that was detected in 
December 2020. It is believed that malicious code was snuck into 
an update on the software Orion (made by SolarWinds, a 
network-monitoring company) in March 2020.132 Several 
government organizations, Departments of State, Defense, 
Homeland Security, Treasury, and Commerce, and the National 
Institutes of Health reported their networks being breached.133 
 
dependent machines (called in the industry “slave machines”) to perform a 
DDoS attack on the servers. Bocetta, supra note 112. 
 129. See Bocetta, supra note 112 (noting the ease with which AI-assisted 
attacks and algorithms are created). 
 130. Consumers who have had personal information exposed through 
hacking, theft, or negligence have with increasing frequency brought actions, 
often class actions, against the business that held such information in its 
computer system. This Article collects and discusses cases that have addressed 
the liability of private businesses to governments and consumers for a breach 
of data security for consumers’ information when such breach has occurred in 
the course of the private business in question. See Eric C. Surette, Annotation, 
Liability of Businesses to Governments and Consumers for Breach of Data 
Security for Consumers’ Information, 1 A.L.R.7th Art. 2 (2021). 
 131. See Bocetta, supra note 112. 
 132. See Kari Paul & Lois Beckett, What We Know—and Still 
Don’t — About the Worst-Ever US Government Cyber-Attack, GUARDIAN (Dec. 
19, 2020), https://perma.cc/U758-65MX (detailing the malware attack on Orion 
that allowed hackers to steal information from several U.S. government 
departments). 
 133. See Ellen Nakashima & Craig Timberg, DHS, State and NIH Join 
List of Federal Agencies—Now Five—Hacked in Major Russian 
Cyberespionage Campaign, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2020, 10:20 PM), 
https://perma.cc/8UDH-NH3J (“The list of victims of the cyberespionage, 
which already included the Treasury and Commerce departments, is expected 
to grow and to include more federal agencies and numerous private 
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The Energy Department and the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, responsible for maintaining the United States 
nuclear stockpile, reported their business networks being 
comprised in the attack.134 Security teams realized that their 
initial relief that they had not used the compromised systems 
turned to panic when they realized which third-party 
applications had also been compromised.135 The attackers used 
stealth and several tactics to fly under the radar of detection. 
They used United States based internet addresses, timed their 
intrusions during working hours, and other careful acts to avoid 
raising alarms.136 It is believed that this is the gravest 
cyberattack against the United States in years and it can take 
months to determine which technology supply chains and 
networks were compromised.137 
 
companies . . . .”); David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, More Hacking Attacks 
Found as Officials Warn of “Grave Risk” to U.S. Government, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
17, 2020), https://perma.cc/2VY3-GV67 (last updated Jan. 5, 2021) [hereinafter 
More Hacking] (noting that the attack appeared to extend “beyond nuclear 
laboratories and the Pentagon, Treasury, and Commerce Department 
systems”). 
 134. See More Hacking, supra note 133. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See David E. Sanger et al., Billions Spent on U.S. Defenses Failed to 
Detect Giant Russian Hack, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/Z2WN-TUF5 (last updated Jan. 2, 2021) [hereinafter 
Billions]. The hacked company at the heart of this, SolarWinds, has had 
unstable security measures as employees’ passwords were leaked last year. 
See Raphael Satter et al., Hackers Used SolarWinds’ Dominance against It in 
Sprawling Spy Campaign, REUTERS (Dec. 15, 2020, 8:05 PM), 
https://perma.cc/L939-URPC (emphasizing the vulnerability of SolarWinds’ 
security prior to the attack). SolarWinds’ update server password was 
“solarwinds123.” Id. 
 137. See More Hacking, supra note 133. This will not be limited to only the 
United States government as banks and Fortune 500 companies also use the 
network management tool from Orion. See Billions, supra note 136. This is not 
the first major hack against a United States federal organization. The United 
States Office of Personnel Management was hacked in 2014 and 
security-clearance files on 22.5 million Americans, and 5.6 million sets of 
fingerprints, were taken without detection. See David Alexander, 5.6 Million 
Fingerprints Stolen in U.S. Personnel Data Hack: Government, REUTERS (Sept. 
23, 2015, 10:50 AM), https://perma.cc/65LH-BP3U; Ellen Nakashima, Hacks 
of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million People, Federal Authorities Say, 
WASH. POST (July 9, 2015, 7:33 PM), https://perma.cc/9EFT-7UB5 (noting that 
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2.  Untrustworthy Data 
Attacks on machine-learning is an acute worry of 
cybersecurity experts.138 The technology can manufacture 
alternative data sets (images, music, speech, and even dialogue) 
that can be merged with actual, real-world data in legal systems 
with little to no oversight.139 This false data should leave 
attorneys, judges, and juries uneasy. Scientists have discussed 
adversarial issues in machine-learning,140 but an adversary’s 
goals are not always clear. There are three broad attack 
categories: quality, confidence, and evasion attacks.141 Quality 
attacks are used to drive down the effectiveness of 
machine-learning from the training data, to likely convince the 
code not to execute an effective analytic or cause it to waste time 
trying to improve itself.142 Confidence attacks are used to 
decrease the effectiveness, without impacting the accuracy of 
the training data.143 Evasion attacks are designed to concoct 
specific outcomes for future test samples.144 Machine-learning is 
vulnerable to attack because of two necessary assumptions, that 
the test data is the same as the training data, and that the 
“ground-truth” labels used in the training data are accurate.145 
 
hackers exposed sensitive information of over twenty-two million between two 
major breaches of U.S. government databases in 2014). 
 138. See Harold Kilpatrick, The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence in 
Cybersecurity, SECUREAGE (Aug. 24, 2018), https://perma.cc/6WQW-N6TE 
(recognizing machine-learning as an area of particular concern in 
cybersecurity). 
 139. See id. (defining machine-learning). 
 140. See Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 12 (citing Amir Globerson & Sam 
Roweis, Nightmare at Test Time: Robust Learning by Feature Deletion, ICML 
‘06: PROC. 23RD INT’L CONF. ON MACHINE LEARNING 353–60 (2006)) (asserting 
that adversarial aspects of machine-learning have been discussed for over a 
decade). 
 141. See id. An “adversary” refers to a malicious entity whose aim is to 
prevent the security measure. See Jeremiah Blocki, Adversary Attacks, 
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. SCH. COMPUT. SCI., https://perma.cc/THB4-KPJH. It 
is presented in the idea of a “game” between the user and the system trying to 
attack it. See id. 
 142. See Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 12. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 12–13. 
676 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2021) 
 
Machine-learning is compromised when the data pool is 
poisoned, inserting fraudulent data or code, generating false 
positives or false negatives.146 There are adversarial examples 
of deep neural networks that can be attacked on pre-existing 
audio and visual recognition models.147 Authors Nicolas Carlini 
and David Wagner discovered that there was a way that they 
could insert adversarial examples into the speech-to-text 
systems through slight distortions.148 These authors argue that 
targeted adversarial examples exist in the audio domain by 
attacking a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcription neural 
network (DeepSpeech).149 To do this, the authors conducted an 
experiment where they embedded speech into audio that 
typically should not be recognizable as speech.150 By choosing 
silence as the “target,” Carlini and Wagner were able to hide 
audio from a speech-to-text system.151 With a 100 percent 
success rate, Carlini and Wagner were able to turn any audio 
 
 146. See Kilpatrick, supra note 138 (listing different malicious uses for 
machine-learning). 
 147. See generally Nicolas Papernot & Patrick McDaniel, Deep k-Nearest 
Neighbors: Towards Confident, Interpretable and Robust Deep Learning, PA. 
STATE UNIV. DEP’T OF COMPUT. SCI. & ENG’G (Mar. 13, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/X4MM-7YXV (PDF) (outlining how the lack of robustness in 
adversarial settings leads to complications in the AI predictions). Also, 
Mainuddin Ahmad Jonas and David Evans presented how adversarial attacks 
on image classifications can be hidden in layers, leading to adversarial attacks. 
Mainuddin Ahmad Jonas & David Evans, Poster: Enhancing Adversarial 
Example Defenses Using Internal Layers, INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS SYMP. 
ON SEC. & PRIV. (2018), https://perma.cc/TR7F-JC7P (PDF) [hereinafter 
Enhancing Adversarial Example Defenses]. 
 148. See Chris Edwards, Hidden Messages Fool AI, 62 COMMC’NS ACM 13, 
13–14 (Jan. 2019) (citing Nicholas Carlini & David Wagner, Audio Adversarial 
Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Text, INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS 
SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIV. (2018), https://perma.cc/7HK4-5YFB (PDF)) (explaining 
Carlini and Wagner’s discovery of how to translate adversarial examples into 
speech-to-text systems). 
 149. See id. (describing Carlini and Wagner’s attack on the DeepSpeech 
engine published as open-source code). 
 150. See id. (“Rather than using noise to confuse the system, [Carlini] had 
found the engine was susceptible to slightly modified recordings of normal 
speech or music.”). 
 151. See id. 
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waveform into any target transcription.152 The authors also 
found that it was possible to hide speech inside audio by adding 
adversarial noise to cause the speech-to-text transcription 
neural network to transcribe nothing; music can be transcribed 
as arbitrary speech, and audio can transcribe up to fifty 
characters per second, hiding false data.153 
Google scientist, Christian Szegedy, studied deep neural 
networks and discovered intrinsic blind spots in the deep neural 
networks that were present despite a robust design.154 There 
were contradictions in the neural network’s capability to 
perform accurately. Despite the neural net’s high ability to 
perform and seemingly robust design, it had difficulty 
performing when given adversarial examples that had been 
generated by another neural network.155 
The speech could be hidden so that a deep neural network, 
trained through adversarial machine-learning, might convert it 
to a false data source, and none would be the wiser. The hack 
happening at the creation of training sets that are used to train 
the generator and fool the discriminator, could lead to output 
data made from hacked means and then wrongly deciding 
algorithms. Moreover, these methods of hacks are the types that 
are know right now, and do not account for the other methods 
that could be in use. The complexity of generative adversarial 
networks is that the data breaches happened in such a discreet, 
purposeful, undetectable manner that it takes multiple layers of 
examination to discover precisely why the attack was initiated, 
where the attack occurred, and who perpetrated the attack. 
 
 152. See id. (“The attacks buried subtle glitches and clicks in the speech or 
music at a level that makes it hard for a human hearing the playback to 
detect.”). 
 153. See id. For more ideas on how these adversarial examples work, 
Mainuddin Ahmad Jonas and David Evans outlined how internal layer 
information in deep neural networks can help us gain insights into the nature 
of adversarial examples, to provide insight into improving defenses. See 
Enhancing Adversarial Example Defenses, supra note 147. 
 154. Christian Szegedy et al., Intriguing Properties of Neural Networks, 
INT’L CONF. ON LEARNING REPRESENTATIONS 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/G5XF-
5SC8 (PDF). 
 155. See id. (explaining that if one neural net is used to generate a set of 
adversarial examples, those examples are challenging for another neural 
network to perform). 
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3.  Disparate Outcomes 
Data is only as good as the people who produce it and the 
security that protects it. Bad actors can manufacture results 
that do not serve their intended goals or targets but have a 
second-order effect156 that will cause others to suffer either as a 
result of a backlash or policy shift. This technology is not as 
advanced as is purported. In 2018, the Pentagon’s Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced a $2 
billion commitment to the development of “third-wave” AI tools 
that would show reasoning and contextual awareness—common 
sense.157 Technology that lacks the common sense of an 
eighteen-month-old158 should not determine people’s access to 
due process. AI has recently had two very public incidents of 
disparate outcomes in the last year. In 2019, Apple Credit 
Card’s reliance on their technology led to disparate credit limits 
being issued to husbands and wives with the same credit 
history, sometimes, with a variable differential of 20:1 limit 
compared to the other.159 In the same year, United Health was 
 
 156. See RADEK SILHAVY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE METHODS IN 
INTELLIGENT ALGORITHMS 302 (2019) (detailing the harmful effects that 
information and communications technology can have on the environment). 
 157. See Mark Jones, DARPA Wants to Give AI Common Sense Using 
Child Psychology, TECHHQ (Nov. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/UM3M-6WCP 
(exploring DARPA’s multi-year commitment to developing common sense in 
AI). 
 158. At this time, machine-learning does not have the “common sense” of 
an eighteen-month-old human child. See Alison Gopnik, The Ultimate 
Learning Machines, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2019, 11:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/VYV5-57N3 (“Babies seem to learn much more general and 
powerful kinds of knowledge than AIs do, from much less and much messier 
data.”); Jack Corrigan, DARPA Wants to Build Computers with “Common 
Sense,” NEXTGOV (Oct. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/K8PJ-G8E6 (noting that 
DARPA will compare AI tools against the cognitive abilities of children ages 
zero to eighteen months); Melanie Mitchell, AI Can Pass Standardized Tests—
but It Would Fail Preschool, WIRED (Sept. 10, 2019, 6:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/FS5M-F7RT (arguing that DARPA seems “quite far” from 
developing an AI system with the common sense of an eighteen-month-old). 
 159. See Neil Vigdor, Apple Card Investigated after Gender Discrimination 
Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2019), https://perma.cc/SG8L-64MJ (writing 
about an upset Twitter user whose Apple Card spending limit was twenty 
times higher than his wife’s, despite her higher credit score). Goldman Sachs 
said it would reevaluate credit limits on a case-by-case basis. See Kif Leswing, 
Goldman Sachs Will Reevaluate Apple Card Credit Limits After Bias 
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accused of using an algorithm that led to sicker Black Americans 
receiving differential medical treatment than less ill White 
persons,160 even though a robust body of law prohibits this type 
of unconstitutional outcome.161 These examples show that the 
implementation of the technology requires vigilant and constant 
oversight before it is allowed to be used on the public. 
One of the problems of AI is that false data results and 
racist data—implicit and intentional—may also be produced, 
leading to disparate outcomes. “Tay” was an AI bot designed and 
released by Microsoft Corporation in 2016.162 It was designed to 
mirror the language patterns of a nineteen-year-old girl and 
programmed to learn all human interactions by interacting with 
people via Twitter.163 Within sixteen hours, Tay had to be shut 
down due to several racist, anti-Semitic, and sexually charged 
messages in response to other Twitter users.164 Microsoft had 
not been able to determine if Tay’s racist responses were based 
on a “repeat after me” capability (which may or may not be a 
 
Allegations, CNBC (Nov. 11, 2019, 7:26 PM), https://perma.cc/3MZF-KMTP. 
Some experts are arguing that the disparate outcomes are not based on the 
algorithm coding errors. See, e.g., Diane Harris, Apple Card Gender Bias? 
Don’t Assume Its Discrimination, Experts Warn, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 12, 2019, 
6:18 AM), https://perma.cc/U49N-P75J (considering various possible causes of 
the disparities). 
 160. Melanie Evans & Anna Wilde Mathews, New York Regulator Probes 
UnitedHealth Algorithm for Racial Bias, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 26, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8MAL-6QSM (“New York’s insurance regulator said it is 
launching an investigation into a UnitedHealth Group Inc. algorithm that a 
study found prioritized care for healthier white patients over sicker black 
patients.”). 
 161. A letter to UnitedHealth by the Department of Financial Services and 
Department of Health outlined that “the N.Y. Insurance Law, N.Y. Human 
Rights Law, N.Y. General Business Law, and federal Civil Rights Act [all] 
protect against discrimination for certain classes of individuals.” Letter from 
Linda Lacewell, Superintendent, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs. & Howard 
Zucker, Comm’r, N.Y. State Dep’t of Health, to David Wichmann, Chief Exec. 
Officer, UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. (Oct. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/N3KS-KYFB 
(PDF) [hereinafter Letter from Linda Lacewell]. 
 162. See Peter Bright, Tay, the Neo-Nazi Millennial Chatbot, Gets 
Autopsied, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 25, 2016, 7:15 PM), https://perma.cc/FR6N-
JVVU (stating that Microsoft created Tay in 2016 to replicate a similar 
Chinese bot). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. (listing examples of the tweets). 
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built-in feature), whether it was a learned response, or if it was 
an example of complex behavior that cannot be traced to code.165 
Users told Tay that the Holocaust did not occur.166 Tay did not 
know what the Holocaust was (only that it was a proper noun), 
and since users told Tay it did not happen, Tay then proceeded 
to operate and evolve with that base understanding.167 
Peter Lee, Microsoft’s corporate vice president of Microsoft 
Research, apologized and acknowledged that the testing done 
did not accurately prepare for the fact that the public would 
actively seek to destabilize and attack the bot.168 Caroline 
Sinders, a machine-learning designer and Fellow of the Digital 
Harvard Kennedy School, documented concerns about 
machine-learning and bots and how they learn.169 She noted 
that AI must be trained using a body of data, and this corpus 
must be sorted through knowledge trees that direct a question 
or type of question to a pre-formed answer.170 However, 
Microsoft did not restrict specific pre-imagined queries from 
being directed to certain outcomes.171 While they did code for 
sensitive topics such as Eric Garner’s murder by law 
enforcement, it did not have hard-coded responses to particular 
terms such as rape, domestic violence, or Holocaust denials.172 
This lack of pre-thought is a fundamental design flaw, as things 
like racism, privacy, and danger continue to be embedded in 
AI.173 The level of cyberattacks that can happen (not in the 
public eye, as with Tay, but deep within the design of the AI) is 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See id. (explaining that Tay was incapable of recognizing why users 
would lie to her about the Holocaust). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Caroline Sinders, Microsoft’s Tay Is an Example of Bad Design, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/Y4Y6-X6WX. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Facebook deals with this as it relates to requests to remove false 
information from its social media platform. See Working to Stop 
Misinformation and False News, FACEBOOK (2017), https://perma.cc/WY3S-
PHJY (outlining the steps Facebook is taking to combat false news). 
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uncertain, and the most concerning emerging issue in 
cybersecurity today.174 
Additionally, there is growing alarm within the legal 
community about the unintended outcomes from relying on AI 
created outcomes. For instance, “Poverty Lawgorithms: A 
Poverty Lawyer’s Guide to Fighting Automated 
Decision-Making Harms on Low-Income Communities” is a 
guide authored by Michele Gilman that assists lawyers who 
advocate for low-socioeconomic clients about the hidden ways AI 
has been imbedded in family law, housing, workers’ rights, 
immigration surveillance, public benefits, schools and 
education, and consumer law.175 These efforts by attorneys176 
remind all that the legal community must be vigilant in 
reviewing all instances of third-party software and applications 
used by United States systems. 
D.  Prevention Efforts by Scientists Are Insufficient 
Bad data—whether found or created—affects the outputs, 
and the AI will learn inaccurate results, producing disastrous 
outcomes.177 Software designers are continually working to 
ensure efficiency, accuracy, transparency, and accountability.178 
It is humorous to read stories of how AI mistakes a cat for 
 
 174. See Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 14 (acknowledging that adversarial 
machine-learning is a new and developing field but contending that the 
dangers of cyberattacks require continued use of machine-learning methods). 
 175. Michele Gilman, Poverty Lawgorithms: A Poverty Lawyer’s Guide to 
Fighting Automated Decision-Making Harms on Low-Income Communities, 
DATA & SOC’Y (Sept. 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/4H4K-LR9G (PDF). 
 176. See Karen Hao, The Coming War on the Hidden Algorithms That Trap 
People in Poverty, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/4ECR-
QDXB (explaining how attorneys are fighting the automated systems that 
deny the poor housing, jobs and basic services). 
 177. See Thomas C. Redman, If Your Data Is Bad, Your Machine Learning 
Tools Are Useless, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/3PHW-
LAD2 (“The quality demands of machine learning are steep, and bad data can 
rear its ugly head twice both in the historical data used to train the predictive 
model and in the new data used by that model to make future decisions.”). 
 178. See Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How Artificial Intelligence Is 
Transforming the World, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 24, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/J4AC-AESD (showing how software designers can anticipate 
problems and analyze specific issues within AI systems). 
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guacamole179 or a turtle for a rifle.180 However, the same AI can 
make life-threatening mistakes. It can wrongly decide that a 
patient does not need medical care based on faulty data sets.181 
It can wrongly decide that a wife will be a higher credit risk than 
her husband based on faulty data sets.182 It can wrongly 
determine that a defendant has a higher likelihood of recidivism 
based on faulty data sets.183 Left unsupervised, unregulated AI 
directly impacts access to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, 
and fairness in the legal system.184 
 
 179. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Hidden Costs of Automated Thinking, 
NEW YORKER (July 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/W55L-MZT4 (describing a 
machine-learning model that became 99.99 percent sure it was given a 
photograph of guacamole, even though the photograph was a cat to human 
eyes). 
 180. See Anish Athalye et al., Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples, 
PROC. 35TH INT’L CONF. ON MACH. LEARNING (June 7, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/N5FQ-PXPG (PDF) (describing a study in which an algorithm 
consistently classified poses of a 3D-printed turtle as a rifle); Kim Martineau, 
Why Did My Classifier Just Mistake a Turtle for a Rifle?, MIT NEWS (July 31, 
2019), https://perma.cc/P4S2-KBP5. 
 181. United Health was accused of using an algorithm that led to sicker 
Black Americans receiving medical treatment less often than less ill White 
persons. See Evans & Mathews, supra note 160. “New York’s insurance 
regulator said it is launching an investigation into a UnitedHealth Group Inc. 
algorithm that a study found prioritized care for healthier white patients over 
sicker black patients.” Id. 
 182. Apple Credit Card led to disparate credit limits being issued to 
husbands and wives with the same credit history, sometimes at the magnitude 
of a twenty times difference. Vigdor, supra note 159. Goldman Sachs said it 
would reevaluate credit limits on a case-by-case basis. See Leswing, supra note 
159. Some experts are arguing that the disparate outcomes are not based on 
the algorithm coding errors. See Harris, supra note 159. 
 183. See Cynthia Rudin et al., The Age of Secrecy and Unfairness in 
Recidivism Prediction, 2.1 HARV. DATA SCI. REV. 1, 2–4 (2020) (discussing the 
lack of transparency and data inconsistencies in predictive modeling in 
criminal justice databases). 
 184. Amazon has created the leading facial recognition software called 
“Rekognition,” which Amazon has advertised and promoted to police agencies 
for use in criminal investigations. See John Warner, If You’re Worried 
Artificial Intelligence Is Coming for You, Read Melanie Mitchell’s New Book, 
CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://perma.cc/8KZZ-L4N9. The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) investigated and discovered that this 
software has been leading to the misidentification of people across the nation, 
as the software incorrectly connected New England professional athletes to 
mugshot databases. Facial Recognition Technology Falsely Identifies Famous 
Athletes, ACLU MASS. (Oct. 21, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://perma.cc/RC77-HJL9. 
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Programmers and scientists, and cybersecurity experts are 
continually working on methods to protect data and systems.185 
Furthermore, scholars are studying how to use AI to defeat 
nefarious AI.186 However, AI developers are taught to let 
efficiency be a driving force.187 Though efficiency allows for a 
smooth system,188 it can flatten human thought, producing what 
one expects and wants to see, rather than what should be 
produced.189 Unexpectedly, technology has crossed into an area 
that coders did not adequately anticipate in the design phase: 
the implications of a self-determining code devoid of human, 
subconscious norms. As Professor Jon Kleinberg, a computer 
scientist from Cornell University, explains: 
We have, perhaps, for the first time, built machines we do 
not understand. . . . [B]ecause they act like us, it would be 
reasonable to imagine that they think like us too. But the reality 
is that they do not think like us at all; at some deep level, we 
 
Nearly 17 percent of the athletes were falsely identified, and an independent 
computer science expert verified the results. Id. A similar test completed by 
the ACLU of California, found the misidentification of twenty-eight sitting 
members of Congress with a disproportionate number of the false matches 
being people of color. Steven Melendez, Amazon’s Face-Recognition Tool 
Falsely Matched California Lawmakers to Mugshots, ACLU Says, FAST CO. 
(Aug. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/U46W-A6BA. 
 185. For examples, see Bocetta, supra note 112; The Threat of AI-Powered 
Cyberattacks Looms Large, AI BUS. (Sept. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/86CL-
2WKU; Ramsés Gallego, AI and Security: Machine Learning Is a Threat 
Detection Game-Changer, TECHBEACON (July 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/XJE8-
ZG3K. 
 186. See generally John Leyden, AI-Powered Honeypots: Machine Learning 
May Help Improve Intrusion Detection, DAILY SWIG (May 11, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/PE22-VWTX. 
 187. See FOER, supra note 24, at 71 (“When programmers are taught 
algorithmic thinking, they are told to venerate efficiency as a paramount 
consideration.”). 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. at 70 (arguing that algorithms remove humans from the whole 
process of inquiry). “Data, like victims of torture, tell its interrogator what it 
wants to hear.” Id. at 71. Technology and culture writer Nicholas Carr stated, 
“The more time we spend immersed in digital waters, the shallower our 
cognitive capabilities become due to the fact we ceased exercising control over 
our attention: ‘The Net is by design an interruption system, a machine geared 
for dividing attention.’” SCHWAB, supra note 25, at 101–02 (citing NICHOLAS 
CARR, THE SHALLOWS: WHAT THE INTERNET IS DOING TO OUR BRAINS (2011)). 
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don’t even really understand how they’re producing the behavior 
we observe. This is the essence of their incomprehensibility.190 
There are efforts for AI to be more directed in their creation 
by expanding the types of networks created or in new fields of 
study, as at Stanford191 and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology.192 
However, scientists understand they are barely at the level 
of even knowing that an attack did occur. Cybersecurity has 
become less dependable,193 and scientists patch the breaches, as 
opposed to fortifying all points of entry for a hack.194 Scholars 
examining this work understand there must be a sense of 
“watchful paranoia.”195 But, this hacked AI can slip into 
technology used in the criminal justice system. Moreover, even 
the most expeditious committees in the U.S. House of 
Representatives will be alarmingly too late, considering that 
this technology is already being used to decide people’s liberty 
interests in the criminal justice system.196 
 
 190. Jon Klienberg & Sendhil Mullainathan, We Built Them, But We Don’t 
Understand Them, EDGE (Jan. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/MB9W-MCFY. 
 191. See Ethan Baron, Stanford Unveils New AI Institute, Built to Create 
‘A Better Future for All Humanity’, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019, 5:07 PM), 
https://perma.cc/CBA7-5R9M (describing a new institute dedicated to using AI 
to build the best-possible future). 
 192. See Terri Park, Advancing Artificial Intelligence Research, MIT NEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/492M-B4HL (discussing a new collaboration 
that awards funding to projects that target the advancement of trustworthy 
AI, enhancing human cognition in complex environments, and AI for 
everyone). 
 193. See Jack Wallen, 10 Cybersecurity Stories in 2019 That Make Us Feel 
Less Secure, TECHREPUBLIC (Dec. 15, 2019, 1:10 PM), https://perma.cc/JDM7-
K3RF (discussing the memorable security threats in 2019). 
 194. See id. (explaining that for many threats the initial point of entry 
needs serious vetting and security which includes a level of risk many 
businesses are not willing to take). 
 195. Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 14. 
 196. House Resolution 153 was referred to committee on February 27, 
2019, to develop guidelines for the ethical development of artificial 
intelligence. H.R. Res. 153, 116th Cong. (2019). 
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II. RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ARE NOT SECURE 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,197 part of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,198 had a seemingly 
pure motive: to increase consistency in U.S. federal sentencing 
by decreasing recidivism.199 Unfortunately, these reforms were 
made in a haphazard method that was not evidence-based nor 
vetted against existing data.200 Stopping crime with technology 
has become a lucrative industry.201 And since then, courts and 
correction departments have been using algorithms to 
determine a defendant’s “risk” of not appearing for court 
appearances. These algorithms have been used in determining 
bail, sentencing, and parole.202 Jurisdictions are beginning to 
analyze the code’s efficacy and accuracy. 203 
 
 197. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
 198. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 199. See Charles Summers & Tim Willis, Pretrial Risk Assessment 
Research Summary, BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE 1 (Oct. 18, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/G6AQ-3RRX (PDF) [hereinafter Pretrial Risk Assessment 
Research Summary]. 
 200. Some have studied that arguments made in murder and violent crime 
decreases were causally linked to higher mandatory minimums put into effect 
in the 1980s. See Doris Layton Mackenzie et al., Sentencing and Corrections 
in the 21st Century: Setting the Stage for the Future, NAT. CRIM. JUST. 
REFERENCE SERV. (July 2001), https://perma.cc/5SJH-MCUK (PDF). 
 201. See Griffard, supra note 5, at 48 (noting how predictive policing has 
developed into a “multi-million dollar business” (citing Andrew G. Ferguson, 
Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1109, 1131–32 (2017)). 
 202. See Alex Chohlas-Wood, Understanding Risk Assessment Instruments 
in Criminal Justice, BROOKINGS INST. (June 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/8CW2-
PA4F (discussing algorithmic tools designed to predict the risk that the 
defendant will fail to appear in court). 
 203. See Kim Steven Hunt & Robert Dumville, Recidivism Among Federal 
Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (Mar. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/QN5M-CLEM (PDF). The federal government acknowledged 
it still needed to complete a study on the scores produced by PRAIs. Eric 
Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Speech Presented at the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual Meeting and 13th State Criminal 
Justice Network Conference, Philadelphia, PA (Aug. 1, 2014). 
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The objective of predictive policing tools is to reduce 
criminal activity in a community.204 Various tools can outline 
where crime has occurred but also predict potential crime. 
Pretrial Risk Assessment Instruments (PRAIs) purport to assist 
courts in predicting future behavior of defendants related to 
recidivism risks and failure to appear at trial; PRAIs are used 
in almost every state.205 Over sixty risk-assessment tools are 
being used in the criminal justice system, combining variables 
such as demographics, family background, and additional 
factors related to criminal history and psychological and 
sociological considerations.206 Risk-assessment tools generally 
outperform expert opinion by about 10 percent207 and are seen 
as not substantially distinguishable from the human error rate 
of judges and parole boards.208 However, the use of the tool 
 
 204. See Tim Lau, Predictive Policing Explained, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 
(Apr. 1. 2020), https://perma.cc/N6SC-RT72 (stating the predictive policing is 
designed to identify where to deploy police or to identify people who are more 
likely to commit a crime). 
 205. See Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System: Risk Assessment 
Tools, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://perma.cc/RX7W-ZS6S (last updated Feb. 
2020). 
 206. See Alyssa M. Carlson, The Need for Transparency in the Age of 
Predictive Sentencing Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 309 (2017). For a 
sampling of state statutes regulating risk assessment instruments in criminal 
justice, see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1910 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 5120.111 (LexisNexis 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 2021); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 5120.115 (LexisNexis 2021); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 33.07.020 
(2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §  5-201 (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.25 
(West 2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2104 (2021); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/110-6.4 (2021); MD. CODE ANN. MD. RULES 4-216.1 (LexisNexis 2021); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-25 (West 2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-124 (LexisNexis 
2021); UTAH CODE JUD. ADMIN. 3-116 (LexisNexis 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 7554C (2021); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5A-5-7 (LexisNexis 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 17-22.5-404 (West 2021); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-9-45 (2021); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 706-670 (LexisNexis 2021); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-01-04 
(West 2021); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 332.21 (West 2021); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 2154.7 (2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-803 (2021). 
 207. Kia Rahnama, Science and Ethics of Algorithms in the Courtroom, 5 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 169, 175 (2019) (citing Anna Maria Barry-Jester et 
al., The New Science of Sentencing, MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 4, 2015, 7:15 
AM), https://perma.cc/Z988-NTHJ). 
 208. See id. at 175–76 (noting that “the underlying truth [is] that 
algorithms will . . . be designed and created by people who inevitably hold 
value-laden presumptions and intuitions is in escapable”). 
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varies across most of the United States jurisdictions with court 
approval.209 
The first goal of PRAIs is to ensure that pretrial decisions 
are more consistent across jurisdictions.210 There are no 
standardized metrics for risk assessments, so defendants are 
categorized based on subjective judgments of pretrial officers, 
which can result in inconsistent, disparate, and potentially 
arbitrary recommendations in contrast to the intent of the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984211 and pretrial recommendations from the 
American Bar Association,212 the National Association of 
Pretrial Services Agencies213 and the National Institute of 
Justice.214 The second goal is to maximize the number of 
successful pretrial decisions.215 This goal is achieved “by 
maximizing the number of defendants who are released before 
they are tried, without negatively affecting appearances and 
court rates or public safety.”216 The factors that were associated 
most with termination for pretrial risk were related to the 
nature of the charges pending at the time of the arrest, the 
history of criminal arrests and convictions and active 
community supervision at the time of the arrest, history of 
failure to appear, history of violence, residential stability, 
employment civility, community ties, and substance abuse.217 
For instance, the PRAI used in New Orleans was based on the 
most extensive, most diverse set of pretrial records ever 
assembled—750,000 cases from nearly three hundred 
 
 209. See State v. Headley, 926 N.W.2d 545, 552–53 (Iowa 2019) (holding 
that it was within the discretion of the trial court to consider risk assessment 
tools on their face if it was used in a presentence investigation report and its 
use did not violate the defendant’s due process rights). 
 210. See Pretrial Risk Assessment Research Summary, supra note 199, at 
1. 
 211. 18 U.S.C §§ 3141–3156 
 212. See Pretrial Risk Assessment Research Summary, supra note 199, at 
1. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. at 2. 
 216. Id. 
 217. See id. (citing Marie VanNostrand & Kenneth J. Rose, Pretrial Risk 
Assessment in Virginia, VA. DEP’T CRIM. JUST. SERVS. (May 1, 2009), 
https://perma.cc/32R4-FF9R (PDF)). 
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jurisdictions.218 Research shows that actuarial risk assessment 
instruments can provide some predictive benefits for pretrial 
decisions.219 It is noteworthy that although PRAIs state they do 
not explicitly rely on factors such as race, ethnicity, or 
geography,220 variables such as “risk” can be a proxy for race.221 
State legislation related to the regulation of risk 
assessment instruments is varied and, in some instances, vague. 
States use a variety of terms such as “risk assessment 
instruments” (“RAI”) and “risk assessment tools.”222 Very few of 
these statutes explicitly state that the instrument they are 
using is digital. Some describe it as a “worksheet” while others 
simply do not address the question.223 Some states only list 
specific departments using their RAI (i.e., juvenile detention, 
probation office), while others only list information at a local 
district level.224 Two commonly used products are COMPAS and 
the Arnold Tool. This section analyzes these two products. 
 
 218. Shelbi Flynn et al., Pretrial Risk Assessment: The Use of 
Evidence-Based Assessment Tools During Bond Setting, CITY OF NEW ORLEANS, 
https://perma.cc/3WCY-ECVS. 
 219. See Pretrial Risk Assessment Research Summary, supra note 199, at 
4. 
 220. MATTHEW DEMICHELE ET AL., THE INTUITIVE-OVERRIDE MODEL: 
NUDGING JUDGES TOWARD PRETRIAL RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 24 (2018), 
https://perma.cc/7KET-8854 (PDF). 
 221. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of 
Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 238 (2015). 
 222. See John Logan Koepke & David G. Robinson, Danger Ahead: Risk 
Assessment and the Future of Bail Reform, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1725, 1780–81 
(2018) (describing nationwide adoption of such tools). 
 223. See Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual 
Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment 
Program, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 701 (2007) (explaining that the 
Virginia system relies upon “simple worksheets that tally demerits for past 
crimes with additional penalties for demographic characteristics found to be 
correlated with the commission of crime”). I opted not to include any statutes 
that only say something to the effect of “we use an RAI” with no further detail. 
Just because a state is not represented does not necessarily mean they are not 
using some form of AI. 
 224. The few statutes that go into detail about their standards require 
checking every five years for accuracy. Indiana’s statute notes explicitly that 
rules will be adopted for RAI standards “before January 2020.” IND. CODE 
§ 35-33-8-0.5 (2021). 
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COMPAS is an acronym for Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions.225 COMPAS 
was developed by Equivant (formerly Northpoint)226 and is used 
throughout the United States to determine pretrial detention, 
sentencing, or probation and parole.227 The COMPAS scale is an 
algorithmically determined assessment that claims to predict an 
individual’s risk of recidivism.228 The COMPAS assessment 
roughly estimates the risk of recidivism using several variables. 
Combining data from interviews with the offender,229 
information derived from the offender’s criminal history and 
observations of the person,230 and other unknown factors, 
COMPAS derives a score to represent a defendant’s likelihood 
of recidivism or potential behavior while incarcerated.231 
COMPAS provides users with a pretrial release risk scale,232 
general recidivism scale,233 and a violent recidivism scale.234 
The Arnold Tool is another PRAI that has gained national 
attention. The Arnold Tool was created by Arnold Ventures 
(formerly The Laura and John Arnold Foundation) and has been 
implemented in more than forty jurisdictions.235 The Arnold 
Tool is implemented differently depending on the jurisdiction. 
For instance, the New Jersey Constitution states that the 
Arnold Tool is to calculate the defendant’s dangerousness, 
history of failure to appear, and obstruction of the criminal 
 
 225. See Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes 
than Random People, ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/BD4A-MHP8. 
 226. See id. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 27 
(2015). 
 229. For a sample of the COMPAS Risk Assessment questions, see Julia 
Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/925Z-W289. 
 230. Such as criminal involvement, relationships and lifestyle, personality 
and attitudes, family, and social exclusion. See Algorithms in the Criminal 
Justice System: Risk Assessment Tools, supra note 205, at 26. 
 231. See NORTHPOINTE, supra note 228, at 27. 
 232. See id. 
 233. See id. at 26. 
 234. See id. at 28. 
 235. See, e.g., Public Safety Assessment for Pretrial Release and Detention, 
N.M. COURTS, https://perma.cc/9ULH-2NTA. 
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justice.236 By comparison, New Mexico has a constitutionally 
mandated implementation that does not require a calculation of 
a defendant’s failure to appear or obstruct justice.237 
Jurisdictions also differ in the steps the courts must follow 
before rendering a verdict, such as four additional steps in 
Arizona, five steps in Santa Cruz County, California, and in 
New Jersey, ten additional steps that must be taken.238 
Nearly 120 criminal justice organizations have called for a 
halt to the use of all PRAIs,239 and district attorney associations 
and criminal defense organizations agree that risk assessment 
tools are opening unintended consequences that leave 
defendants and victims without recourse.240 Civil rights 
organizations note six areas of concern regarding the use of 
algorithmic decision-making tools: lack of transparency, lack of 
accuracy, failure to provide the necessary information, the 
perpetuation of racial bias and discrimination, subjective 
interpretation by decision-makers, and measurement of group 
risk instead of individual risk.241 COMPAS came to the public’s 
 
 236. See RAUL TORREZ & DIANNA LUCE, MINORITY REPORT: AD HOC 
COMMITTEE TO REVIEW PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION PROCEDURES 4 
(2020), https://perma.cc/FZ4G-YUV9 (PDF) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT] 
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-18 (West 2020)). 
 237. See id. (citing N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13). 
 238. See id. at 5 (comparing jurisdictions). New Mexico requires no 
additional steps. See id. The University of New Mexico Institute for Social 
Research published a response to the Minority Report outlining points of 
agreement and dissension about the interpretation of the data gathered. UNIV. 
N.M., INST. FOR SOC. RSCH., RESPONSE TO THE MINORITY REPORT (2020), 
https://perma.cc/7F7Z-V44E. 
 239. See LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK 
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS 
10, https://perma.cc/WB7C-XH7D (PDF) [hereinafter USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK 
ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS] (listing signatory organizations). 
 240. See Eric W. Siddall, The Real World and the Failure of “Bail 
Assessment Tools”, ASS’N OF DEPUTY DIST. ATT’YS, https://perma.cc/K2FW-
Q58N (“The Arnold tool has led to the massive release of violent criminals and 
tragic results.”); MINORITY REPORT, supra note 236, at 3 (noting that 23 percent 
of defendants released before trial committed new crimes during the pretrial 
period). 
 241. See USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS, supra note 
239, at 2–4 (recommending principles that “provide tools and guidance for 
reducing the harm that these assessments can impose”). 
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attention because of a prominent ProPublica article242 which 
outlined concerning outcomes from the product and a Wisconsin 
Supreme Court case, State v. Loomis,243 that also defined glaring 
concerns of the product. The ProPublica article noted that 
COMPAS performed worse on one measure of performance 
(false positive rates) for Black individuals than White 
individuals.244 Other researchers counter that the disparity can 
be explained by differences in the underlying offense rates for 
each race without a biased model.245 However, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in State v. Loomis addressed this issue. Mr. 
Loomis wanted clarity and redress due to the proprietary nature 
of the software, the inability to identify high-risk persons 
because of the way the data is gathered, lack of cross-validation 
with the Wisconsin specific population, concerns about 
disproportionately classified minority offenders, and that the 
software was designed for post-sentencing determinations.246 
Scientist Kristin Lum has also discovered concerning outcomes 
 
 242. See Angwin et al., supra note 229 (arguing that the risk assessment 
tool was unreliable in predicting violent crime and produced racially disparate 
risk scores). 
 243. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
 244. See Angwin et al., supra note 229; see also Alex Chohlas-Wood, 
Understanding Risk Assessment Instruments in Criminal Justice, BROOKINGS 
INST. (June 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/EX3H-WD3D (characterizing the 
ProPublica findings as the “most notable claim” of discrimination made 
against a risk assessment tool). 
 245. See id. (citing Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and 
Mismeasure of Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine Learning, CORNELL 
UNIV. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://perma.cc/2BTB-4CD7 (PDF)). After applying a 
traditional measure of model fairness, researchers noted that evidence of 
racial discrimination faded. See Cholas-Wood, supra note 244 (citing Sam 
Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing 
Decisions Was Labeled Biased against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear., 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3KTN-VK3V). 
 246. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769; Angwin et al., supra note 229 
(explaining Loomis’ arguments against the use of COMPAS in his sentencing 
decision). For details on how ProPublica analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism 
Algorithm, see Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS Recidivism 
Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/S669-RR9N. A group 
of Stanford researchers determined it was virtually impossible to create a 
predictive model for all races that did not protect disparities in those who 
suffer the harm of incorrect predictions, though it has been contested. See 
Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 245 (“[T]here is a mathematical limit to how 
fair any algorithm—or human decision-maker—can ever be.”). 
692 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2021) 
 
from the use of the Arnold Tool. Booking charges that did “not 
result in a conviction (i.e., charges that are dropped or end in an 
acquittal) increased the recommended level of pretrial 
supervision in around 27 percent of cases evaluated by the 
tool.”247 Mr. Loomis, the ProPublica article, and Dr. Lum note 
that a lack of transparency in the algorithms leaves neither 
camp with clarity.248 AI products used in the criminal justice 
system are just as vulnerable to attack as other industries.249 As 
AI is used in policing, pretrial detention, sentencing, and 
probation, these products must increase transparency to ward 
against cyberattacks and bias due to various factors. 
III.  LEGAL OPTIONS FOR PEOPLE HARMED BY UNTRUSTWORTHY 
AI IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
The Sixth Amendment250 affords defendants the right to 
face their accusers and to review the evidence against them.251 
 
 247. Kristian Lum et al., The Impact of Overbooking on a Pre-Trial Risk 
Assessment Tool, in FAT* ‘20: PROCS. OF THE 2020 CONF. ON FAIRNESS, 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY 482, 482 (2020), https://perma.cc/HD6R-
X2NP (PDF). 
 248. See, e.g., Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 757 (noting Mr. Loomis’ assertion 
that using the COMPAS risk assessment tool at sentencing “violates a 
defendant’s right to be sentenced based upon accurate information, in part 
because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents him from assessing its 
accuracy”). 
 249. See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Hack Brief: Anonymous Stole and Leaked 
a Megatrove of Police Documents, WIRED (June 22, 2020, 12:48 PM), 
https://perma.cc/7TRF-563K (reporting the leak of more than a million files 
from more than two hundred state, local, and federal law enforcement 
agencies). 
 250. “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 251. Brady v. Maryland provides the United States’ standard of 
“discovery” as outlined in the Sixth Amendment; this standard introduces the 
production of evidence by the prosecution that would be favorable to the 
accused. See 373 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1963); MARK J. MAHONEY, THE RIGHT TO 
PRESENT A DEFENSE 12 (1994) (noting that Brady’s discussion of discovery 
rights was based in the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment). 
Mahoney argues that because of the lack of a common law right to discovery 
before trial and restrictions to certain types of materials, discovery practices 
in the United States do not reflect all of the ways compulsory process 
requirements should be interpreted. MAHONEY, supra, at 14. And in the 
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Though the evidence procurement framework is established in 
Brady v. Maryland, 252 it does not incorporate the reality of how 
AI works. Other paths must be created for recourse. This section 
will discuss how data breaches are dealt with in the law, outside 
of the criminal justice system, and through case law from 
Wisconsin and New Jersey. It also presents potential theories of 
liability for wrongfully convicted defendants and third-party 
victims based on AI-based software. 
A.  Impact of Data Errors Outside of the Criminal Justice 
System 
In light of the threat landscape and the technology 
capabilities, it is vital to think of cybersecurity through statutes 
such as the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018253 and the 
European Union General Data Protection Regulation of 2016.254 
Data protection and privacy law provide an underpinning for 
why secured data is so necessary to justice. Since May 2018, the 
European Union General Data Protection Regulation (EU 
GDPR) has provided data protection and privacy, giving 
individuals control over their personal data.255 The EU GDPR 
creates a presumption that applying algorithms to personal data 
is unlawful, barring certain circumstances.256 This has led to 
 
absence of an express right to discover algorithms, a person must be permitted 
a method to confront their accuser, as outlined in the Confrontation Clause of 
the Sixth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 252. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 253. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2021). 
 254. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and 
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. 
(L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
 255. See Sahar Bhaimia, The General Data Protection Regulation: The 
Next Generation of EU Data Protection, 18 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 21, 21–22 (2018) 
(explaining that the EU GDPR updated existing EU data protection law but 
retained its core principles and values). 
 256. See Andrew Burt & Stuart Shirrell, AI Is Rising, and Governments 
Are Starting to React, LAW.COM (Feb. 28, 2018), https://perma.cc/RFR2-8FU9. 
The regulation also offers several considerable rights, such as the right to 
receive a type of explanation when an algorithm makes a decision that has a 
particular kind of impact. See id. 
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recourse for harmed individuals. For instance, the French Data 
Protection Authority fined Google €50 million ($57 million) for 
EU GDPR violations connected to the unauthorized harvesting 
and use of personal data.257 Modeled in part on the EU GDPR, 
the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which took effect 
in January of 2020, protects California residents regarding their 
personal data and its use.258 Both laws provide the right to be 
informed, the right of portability, the right to access, and the 
 
 257. See Mathieu Rosemain, France Fines Google $57 Million for European 
Privacy Rule Breach, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2019, 11:31 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8TYJ-4XJZ (explaining that the EU GDPR gives European 
regulators the ability to levy “fines of up to 4 percent of global revenue for 
violations”). Microsoft quietly took down their facial recognition data after a 
Financial Times report. See Murgia, supra note 81 (citing Madhumita Murgia, 
Who’s Using Your Face? The Ugly Truth About Facial Recognition, FIN. TIMES 
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/7YJS-5GKE). Technology policy researcher, 
Michael Veale suggests Microsoft realized they violated Article 9 of the EU 
GDPR. See id. (“There is reason to believe that the people in data set cannot 
be considered to expressly and clearly have made their faces public.” (quoting 
Michael Veale)). 
 258. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100. The CCPA is the first comprehensive 
data privacy law in the United States. See LAURA JEHL & ALAN FRIEL, CCPA 
AND GDPR COMPARISON CHART 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/3DUD-4CN3 (PDF). 
It was signed into law on June 28, 2018, taking effect on January 1, 2020. See 
id. It is designed to give consumers control over the collection, use, and even 
the sale of their personal data. See id. A space of interest to U.S. privacy 
advocates is how the CCPA aligns with the EU general data protection 
regulation in terms of enforcement and allows consumers to control their 
personal information even when held by third parties. Protections related to 
the right to notice of data collection, the right to access data collected and 
request deletion, and the right to opt out of the sale of personal information, 
could potentially fundamentally change the nature of data collection. CAL. CIV. 
CODE §§ 1798.100(a)–(b), (d), 120(a). As many tech companies are in 
California, this can have unusually far-reaching implications. Right now, 
these are protections for natural persons who are California residents, but it 
will be important to watch if any natural persons outside of California will 
attempt to access these protections. See id. § 1798.100(g) (defining 
“consumer”). “The Right to be Forgotten” in the EU GDPR and CCPA can 
potentially afford individuals a route to private rights of actions. See GDPR, 
art. 17 (establishing a “right to erasure”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105 (providing 
consumers with some rights regarding the “deletion of personal information 
collected by businesses”). For a comparison of GDPR and CCPA, see JEHL & 
FRIEL, supra. Further study of CCPA can provide an additional route for 
recourse for wrongfully convicted defendants and third parties, depending on 
how the data was gathered. 
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right to erasure.259 The EU GDPR creates a “privacy by default” 
legal framework, requiring companies to have a legal basis for 
processing personal data in the EU, meaning prior consent.260 
In contrast, the CCPA creates transparency in California’s data 
economy and rights to consumers, providing an opt-out 
mechanism.261 This distinction of prior consent, unique to the 
EU GDPR, makes the difference, providing a legal strategy for 
privacy first through user control and second, by providing a 
foundation for examining data and the law.262 
Hacked data is an issue that has arisen in several civil 
cases. In Beyer v. Symantec Corp.,263 a class action was filed 
targeting the cybersecurity firm Symantec Corp. over software 
flaws that allegedly rendered consumers’ devices vulnerable to 
hackers.264 In another California case, Smith v. Adobe Systems, 
Inc.,265 Ms. Smith asserted a claim based on “strict liability 
because there were allegedly design defects in Adobe’s products 
and services—more specifically, ‘security flaws,’—which 
purportedly allowed a computer hacker to ‘hijack control of [her] 
browser, files, [and] web content’ and ‘to silently reprogram [her] 
hardware [and] user settings.’”266 In National Election Defense 
 
 259. See JEHL & FRIEL, supra note 258 (comparing the EU GDPR and 
CCPA). Called the “right to erasure” under GDPR, but “right to deletion” under 
CCPA. See CCPA vs GDPR: Compliance with Cookiebot, COOKIEBOT, 
https://perma.cc/8QTR-ALKA (last updated Nov. 30, 2020) [hereinafter CCPA 
vs GDPR] (noting minor differences between these rights). 
 260. See CCPA vs GDPR, supra note 259. 
 261. See What Is GDPR?, COOKIEBOT, https://perma.cc/HD8A-8TBV 
(detailing the GDPR’s extensive requirements); California Consumer Privacy 
Act (CCPA), COOKIEBOT, https://perma.cc/XU74-WGK3 (last updated Nov. 30, 
2020) (explaining that consumers can opt out of having their data sold and 
request the deletion of collected data). The main rights of both laws are the 
right to be informed, the right of portability, and the right to access. See JEHL 
& FRIEL, supra note 258, at 3–5 (providing a side-by-side comparison of the 
elements of these rights in each jurisdiction). For additional comparisons, see 
DATAGUIDANCE & FUTURE OF PRIV. F., COMPARING PRIVACY LAW: GDPR V. 
CCPA 26 – 35 (2018), https://perma.cc/JXG3-MPWY (PDF). 
 262. See CCPA vs GDPR, supra note 259 (noting that the CCPA does not 
require prior consent). 
 263. No. 18-cv-02006, 2019 WL 935135 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019). 
 264. Id. at *1. 
 265. No. C-11-1480, 2011 WL 4404152 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011). 
 266. Id. at *1. 
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Coalition v. Boockvar,267 the plaintiff alleged that there was a 
much-known vulnerability of the voting system, but could not 
prove that they were hacked.268 Without defined harm to defined 
plaintiffs, there are no legal remedies.269 These plaintiffs could 
not recover because they had no way to either access the 
algorithms to prove harm had occurred or would occur without 
correction. This can lead to years of lost opportunities for 
wrongfully convicted defendants and loss of revenues and 
resources.270 But, some plaintiffs have found redress. 
Flawed AI used by states has amounted to millions of 
dollars in lawsuits and fines. The publication, The Markup, 
noted that “even an error rate of 1 percent could upend the lives 
of hundreds of thousands of people.”271 These instances are 
 
 267. No. 674 M.D. 2019 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 24, 2020). 
 268. Id. In the complaint, the plaintiff stated: 
Yet the Commonwealth has chosen to endorse a new voting system, 
the ExpressVote XL, which fails at every one of these core functions 
and violates the plain requirements set forth in the law to 
guarantee them. Moreover, there are continued and credible 
complaints that the system is neither secure nor reliable, and is 
capable of being hacked. 
Brief for Petitioner at 1, Nat’l Election Def. Coal. v. Boockvar, No. 674 M.D. 
2019 (Pa. Commw, Ct. Jan. 24, 2020). 
 269. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“To 
establish Article III standing, an injury must be ‘concrete, particularized, and 
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable 
by a favorable ruling.’” (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 
U.S. 139, 149 (2010))). 
 270. See, e.g., Stephanie Wykstra, Government’s Use of Algorithm Serves 
Up False Fraud Charges, UNDARK (June 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/5GVD-
GSAR (reporting that a Michigan agency falsely charged more than forty 
thousand people with unemployment fraud, causing many of them to lose 
homes and job opportunities). 
 271. Lauren Kirchner & Matthew Goldstein, Access Denied: Faulty 
Automated Background Checks Freeze Out Renters, MARKUP (May 28, 2020, 
5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/G5L8-M3UH. 
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occurring in housing,272 privacy,273 and other categories.274 Lack 
of government oversight into AI can lead to devastating 
outcomes for individuals. For example, from October 2013 to 
September 2016, the Michigan Data Automated System falsely 
accused thousands of people of committing fraud and took 
millions of dollars from them.275 The software, the Michigan 
Integrated Data Automated System (“MiDAS”), was supposed to 
detect fraud and automatically charge people with 
 
 272. Davone Jackson was denied low-income housing because of 
misidentification, leading to almost a yearlong of housing insecurity. See id. 
(noting that Jackson’s suit was settled for an undisclosed sum). Glen Patrick 
Thompson Sr. and his son were left homeless because it connected him to 
another person who had been evicted. See id. (noting that Patrick’s suit was 
also settled for an undisclosed sum). William Hall Jr. was misidentified as a 
sexual offender and could not get approved for a duplex. See id. (noting that 
Hall’s suit is pending). 
 273. See Davey Alba, A.C.L.U. Accuses Clearview AI of Privacy ‘Nightmare 
Scenario’, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/BEK2-2ZBZ (last 
updated June 3, 2020) (reporting that the ACLU sued Clearview for allegedly 
“violat[ing] a state law that forbids companies from using a resident’s 
fingerprints or face scans without consent”). The company created a database 
of over three billion photos across the internet, including Facebook, YouTube, 
Twitter, and Venmo. See id. “Clearview has set out to do what many companies 
have intentionally avoided out of ethical concerns: create a mass database of 
billions of faceprints of people, including millions of Illinoisans, entirely 
unbeknownst to those people, and offer paid access to that database to private 
and governmental actors worldwide.” Complaint at 19, ACLU v. Clearview AI, 
Inc., No. 9337839 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020). Facebook “agreed to pay $550 
million to settle a class-action lawsuit over its use of facial recognition 
technology in Illinois. . . .” Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay $550 
Million to Settle Facial Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/MRJ4-54EN; see also In re Facebook Biometric Info. Priv. 
Litig., 326 F.R.D. 535, 540 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (allowing class certification for 
privacy action against Facebook). 
 274. See, e.g., Maddy Varner & Aaron Sankin, Suckers List: How Allstate’s 
Secret Auto Insurance Algorithm Squeezes Big Spenders, MARKUP (Feb. 25, 
2020, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/J2KH-UAKM (finding that Allstate’s new 
risk algorithm charged more to customers who were already paying the 
highest premiums and “denied meaningful decreases to thousands of Allstate 
customers who the company’s new risk profile showed were paying too much”). 
 275. See Robert N. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System: 
Algorithm Alchemy Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018, 
5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/3YMQ-5PX7 (reporting that the Michigan 
Unemployment Insurance Agency collected about $66 million in one year due 
to the false charges); Wykstra, supra note 270 (noting that the agency failed 
to repay millions of dollars in erroneous charges for years). 
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misrepresentation and demand repayment to the state, 
garnishing wages.276 After two years of using MiDAS, the agency 
charged forty thousand people, billing them at five times the 
original benefits at a rate of 400 percent plus interest.277 It was 
determined that 93 percent of the charges were erroneous.278 
Algorithms in Arkansas and Idaho erroneously cut Medicaid 
benefits.279 In 2019, a Dutch court found that an algorithm that 
detected welfare fraud violated human rights, ordering the 
government to stop using it.280 If a person committed negligence 
to this degree, it would be prosecuted as criminal negligence. 
However, AI developers are protected by outdated mechanisms. 
 
 276. See Wykstra, supra note 270 (“[C]lass actions lawsuits allege that the 
system searched unemployment datasets and used flawed assumptions to flag 
people for fraud . . . .”). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See id. Bauserman v. Unemployment Ins. Agency, No. 333181, 2017 
WL 3044120 (Mich. Ct. App. July 18, 2017) and Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 
912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019), are two class-action suits brought forward by 
people who were impacted by the software in place. The legal director of the 
University of Michigan Law School’s Workers’ Rights Clinic testified before 
the Michigan Senate Oversight Committee that he believed close to twenty 
thousand people were being actively pursued and were having their wages 
garnished. See Wykstra, supra note 270 (noting that the director testified in 
March 2020); Oversight Committee Hearing, MICH. SENATE (Mar. 10, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/JAP3-NBJ3 (providing video of the testimony). It would take 
almost six years before some people would have the charges dismissed. 
Wykstra, supra note 270. 
 279. See Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your 
Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://perma.cc/VJ4F-CUB3 
(describing problems resulting from the implementation of algorithms to 
allocate home health care hours in Arkansas and Idaho); Michele Gilman, AI 
Algorithms Intended to Root Out Welfare Fraud Often End Up Punishing the 
Poor Instead, CONVERSATION (Feb. 14, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://perma.cc/KV7C-
RRRQ (“Program-wide algorithmic errors have . . . plagued Medicare 
eligibility determinations in states such as Indiana, Arkansas, Idaho and 
Oregon.”). 
 280. See Jon Henley & Robert Booth, Welfare Surveillance System Violates 
Human Rights, Dutch Court Rules, GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2020, 8:18 AM), 
https://perma.cc/2HKD-FTQJ (“This is one of the first times a court anywhere 
has stopped the use of digital technologies and abundant digital information 
by welfare authorities on human rights grounds.” (quoting the UN special 
rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights)). 
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B.  Nefarious Actors Provide False Scientific Evidence in 
Criminal Cases, Infringing on Civil Liberties 
Nefarious actors provide false evidence in the criminal 
justice system, infringing on constitutional protections. In 2012, 
Annie Dookhan was arrested for allegedly faking drug results, 
forging documentation, and mixing samples at a state police 
lab.281 A recorded 1,140 inmates were convicted based on her 
potentially tainted evidence.282 Malicious behavior by 
individuals is one morass; but, benign neglect by states 
exacerbates the harm. The Public Safety Crime Lab in Houston 
promoted Jonathan Salvador despite evidence that his practice 
of “dry-labbing” samples (where forensic analysts report results 
of tests that they never executed) had put in jeopardy close to 
five thousand drug cases.283 This is just as intentionally 
 
 281. See CRIMESIDER STAFF, Annie Dookhan, Chemist at Mass. Crime Lab, 
Arrested for Allegedly Mishandling Over 60,000 Samples, CBS NEWS (Sept. 28, 
2012, 6:45 PM), https://perma.cc/MVH9-RRYU (“[Dookhan] tested more than 
60,000 drug samples involving 34,000 defendants during her nine years at the 
lab.”). 
 282. See id. It was initially believed to be ninety samples. Commonwealth 
v. Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530, 536 (Mass. 2014). Dookhan provided false scientific 
credentials and drew no concerns from her supervisors for years. See 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION OF THE 
DRUG LABORATORY AT THE WILLIAM A. HINTON STATE LABORATORY INSTITUTE 
113–15 (2012), https://perma.cc/XB9G-YXJ7 (PDF) (“The most glaring factor 
that led to the Dookhan crisis was the failure of management.”). She 
intentionally turned negative samples into positive and acknowledged she 
could not identify which cases were impacted. See Scott, 5 N.E.3d at 536 
(describing Dookhan’s admissions to state police). Defendants in cases where 
Dookhan served as the primary or secondary chemist were “entitled to a 
conclusive presumption that [the chemist’s] misconduct occurred . . . that it 
was egregious, and that it was attributable to the Commonwealth.” 
Commonwealth v. Gardner, 5 N.E.3d 552, 556–57 (Mass. 2014). 
 283. See the dissent in State v. Lui, 315 P.3d 493, 521 (Wash. 2014), 
outlining several works concerning the laboratory misconduct in Houston. See 
also James Pinkerton & Brian Rogers, Crime Lab Analyst Kept on Job Despite 
Shoddy Work, HOUS. CHRON. (Apr. 5, 2013, 10:25 PM), https://perma.cc/BX7T-
PFJD (discussing the retention of a forensic analyst despite high error rate). 
Other examples abound. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 
318–19 (2009) (describing incidents); Thomas J. Lueck, After Falsified Test 
Results, Kelly Orders Forensic Shakeup, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2007), 
https://perma.cc/BAM7-3NUY (reporting that two police crime lab analysts 
falsely reported results of drug tests). In 2013, New York City’s medical 
examiner’s office had to review more than eight hundred rape cases where a 
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malicious and nefarious as a rogue analyst or department,284 as 
it shows a careless attitude towards integrity. 
Internationally, countries are already having to backtrack 
after software errors led to cases being inappropriately 
determined. In 2019, Denmark reviewed over ten thousand 
court cases that may have been improperly decided because of a 
software bug in a cell phone tracking technology.285 Two 
problems occurred in the Denmark situation. One was that 
during the conversion process of raw data into evidence, the 
system omitted some of the data creating fewer clear images of 
where the cell phone had been.286 Second, some of the cell phone 
tracking data connected phones to the incorrect cell phone 
towers, potentially linking innocent people to crime scenes.287 It 
is estimated that these impacted cases go back to 2012; it will 
require extensive work to see if any of this data proved to be 
decisive in verdicts against defendants.288 There have been 
many cases that have been brought by plaintiffs who have 
attempted redress through wrongful convictions based on 
 
lab technician had mishandled DNA evidence for over ten years. Mark 
Hansen, Crime Labs under the Microscope after a String of Shoddy, Suspect 
and Fraudulent Results, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (Sept. 1, 2013, 10:20 AM), 
https://perma.cc/F3LH-DNEH. Similar instances in St. Paul, Minnesota, West 
Virginia, and Oklahoma City have been documented and many occurred over 
an extended period with little to no oversight by leadership. See id. (arguing 
for increased regulation of crime labs). 
 284. After information was unearthed about serious negligence and 
misconduct by the ASCLD/LAB in North Carolina, an audit was conducted 
that unpacked over 230 cases of “SBI [State Bureau of Investigation] agents 
with[holding] exculpatory evidence or distort[ing] evidence . . . over a 16-year 
period.” Radley Balko, North Carolina’s Corrupted Crime Lab, REASON FOUND. 
(Aug. 23, 2010, 4:30 PM), https://perma.cc/LBT4-LP87; see Craig Jarvis, 
Report Criticized SBI Crime Lab’s Lack of Documentation, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Aug. 20, 2016, 3:43 PM), https://perma.cc/W6V3-7FSW (last updated Aug. 21, 
2016) (discussing the findings of an independent investigation of the SBI crime 
lab). See generally Joseph R. John, ASCLD/LAB Interim Inspection Report, 
AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB’Y DIRS. (2010), https://perma.cc/ZM7V-8ASQ (PDF). 
 285. See Martin Selsoe Sorensen, Flaws in Cellphone Evidence Prompt 
Review of 10,000 Verdicts in Denmark, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/9542-KQER. 
 286. See id. 
 287. See id. 
 288. See id. 
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intentional or negligent handling of evidence.289 If it is already 
shown that state contracted labs provided false evidence and 
testimony, and it is already clear that technology can be 
drastically wrong, there must be recourse available to people 
harmed in the United States criminal justice system by 
potentially unregulated AI. 
C.  Theories of Accountability and Liability from Case Law for 
Victims of Potentially Untrustworthy AI Used in Criminal 
Cases 
This subpart will outline criminal and civil case law where 
risk assessment instruments were used. It will also describe 
legal theories for accountability and liability for victims of 
potentially untrustworthy data used in criminal cases. Potential 
plaintiffs must be able to explain the harm caused by likely 
hacked and unregulated AI.290 
 
 289. See generally, e.g., Creach v. Dookhan, No. 20-10714, 2020 WL 
3256890 (D. Mass. June 16, 2020); Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358 (1st Cir. 
2019); Green v. N.C. State Bureau of Investigation Crime Lab, No. 11-cv-69, 
2018 WL 4356778 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2018); Spencer v. Dookhan, No. 
16-cv-12080, 2017 WL 2785423 (D. Mass. June 27, 2017); Spencer v. Dookhan, 
No. 13-11431, 2014 WL 6904377 (D. Mass. Dec. 5, 2014); Jones v. Han, 993 F. 
Supp. 2d 57 (D. Mass. 2014); Solomon v. Dookhan, No. 13-10208, 2014 WL 
317202 (D. Mass. Jan. 7, 2014); Cage v. City of Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 2d 787 
(N.D. Ill. 2013); Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 830 F. Supp. 2d 432 (N.D. Ill. 
2011); Jimenez v. City of Chicago, 877 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ill. 2012); Jimenez 
v. City of Chicago., 732 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2013); McCarty v. Gilchrist, 646 F.3d 
1281 (10th Cir. 2011); Lincoln v. City of Greenville, No. 4:10-CV-21, 2011 WL 
285231 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 25, 2011); Bryson v. Macy, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (W.D. 
Okla. 2009); Bryson v. Macy, No. CIV-05-1150, 2009 WL 10672213 (W.D. Okla. 
June 17, 2009); Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784 (10th Cir. 2010); 
Holmes v. Pierce, No. 04 C 8311, 2009 WL 57460 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2009); 
Holmes v. Hardy, 608 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2010); Washington v. Wilmore, 407 
F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2005); Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279 (10th Cir. 2004); In 
re W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 445 S.E.2d 165 (W. Va. 1994); 
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993). 
 290. By way of background, Charles H. Moellenberg Jr. et al., addressed 
methods for companies to monitor how the legislatures and courts are shaping 
tort law to apply to products, components, and software incorporating AI and 
ways to use contractual warranties, indemnities, and limitations to control 
liability risks. Charles H. Moellenberg, Jr. et al., United States: Mitigating 
Product Liability for Artificial Intelligence, MONDAQ (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/XGQ6-8N3A. 
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1. Legal Response to Data Requests in Criminal and Civil 
Cases 
a.  State v. Loomis 
The risk assessment instrument, COMPAS, was at the 
center of the State v. Loomis decision.291 Loomis was barred from 
reviewing the algorithms in the software and challenged how 
the proprietary algorithm calculated his risk when determining 
sentencing.292 
In February 2013, Eric Loomis was charged with five 
criminal counts related to a drive-by shooting in La Crosse, 
Wisconsin.293 He denied being involved in the shooting but did 
admit that later that evening, he had driven the same car 
involved in the shooting.294 He was arrested and pleaded guilty 
to two lesser charges of eluding an officer and no contest to 
operating a vehicle without its owner’s consent.295 The judge 
sentenced Loomis within the limits of the two charges where he 
entered a plea.296 Loomis filed a motion for post-conviction 
relief.297 However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled that the 
use of their risk assessment tool at sentencing did not violate 
the defendant’s due process right to be sentenced based on 
 
 291. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016) (focusing on 
whether using COMPAS while sentencing defendants violates their due 
process rights). 
 292. Id. at 761. 
 293. Id. at 754. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id.; see Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 2, State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 
749 (Wis. 2016) (No. 2015AP157-CR), 2016 WL 485419, at *2 (mentioning that 
Loomis pled no contest to two charges, including operating a vehicle without 
its owner’s consent). 
 296. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 756. During intake, the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections interviewed Loomis, gathered information from his 
criminal file and entered it into COMPAS. See id. “On the attempting to flee 
an officer charge, the circuit court sentenced Loomis to four years, with initial 
confinement of two years and extended supervision of two years.” Id. at 756 
n.18. “For operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, the circuit court 
sentenced Loomis to seven years, with four years of initial confinement and 
three years of extended supervision, to be served consecutively with the prior 
sentence.” Id. 
 297. Id. at 756. 
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accurate information, nor did the use of risk assessment tool at 
sentencing violate a defendant’s due process right to an 
individualized sentence.298 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
noted that the trial court judge said she based her determination 
not solely on the COMPAS score but on several additional 
factors and noted that risk scores may not be used “to determine 
whether an offender is incarcerated” or “to determine the 
severity of the sentence.”299 The court did not go to the extent of 
saying that COMPAS could not be used but did find that there 
should be five written warnings for judges that they are to 
review before assessing the pretrial score assigned by COMPAS. 
The five warnings were: noting the proprietary nature of the 
software, noting the inability to identify high-risk persons 
because of the way the data is gathered, noting the lack of 
cross-validation with the Wisconsin specific population, noting 
the concerns about disproportionately classified minority 
offenders, and noting that the software was designed to be used 
only for post-sentencing determinations.300 
 
 298. Id. at 757, 792. The risk assessment tool’s consideration of 
defendant’s gender did not violate defendant’s due process rights. See id. at 
766–67. 
 299. Id. at 769. There is continuing research into what judges explain 
about their thought process in how much weight they give to a risk assessment 
instrument in deciding their opinion. See Joy Wang, UNM Legal Experts Break 
Down Judge’s Decision to Hold Alleged Rapist in Pretrial Detention, KOB4 
(Jan. 30, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://perma.cc/W6YU-Y37E (considering a judge’s 
use of factors such as severity of a new charge in addition to the algorithm). 
 300. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769. The “proprietary nature of COMPAS” 
prevents the disclosure of how risk scores are calculated; 
1. COMPAS scores are unable to identify specific high-risk individuals because 
these scores rely on group data; 
2. although COMPAS relies on a national data sample, there has been “no 
cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population”; 
3. studies “have raised questions about whether [COMPAS scores] 
disproportionately classify minority offenders as having a higher risk of 
recidivism”; and 
4. COMPAS was explicitly developed to assist the Department of Corrections 
in making post-sentencing determinations. 
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b.  Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Foundation 
Though errors using the Arnold Tool have occurred,301 to 
date there has been only one case of the Arnold Tool potentially 
harming a third party not involved in a criminal matter. On 
April 5, 2017, Jules Black was arrested by the New Jersey State 
Police and charged for being a felon in possession of a firearm.302 
The Arnold Tool assigned Black a low Public Safety Assessment 
(PSA) score, and he was released without a determination of a 
need for bail.303 Three days later, he allegedly killed Christian 
Rodgers.304 Rodgers was survived by his mother, June Rodgers, 
who brought a suit both individually and on behalf of her son 
against the Arnold Foundation.305 
This was the first time the Arnold Foundation had been a 
named defendant in a tort suit, and it proved challenging to 
establish a cause of action. Ms. Rodgers framed the Arnold Tools 
algorithm within the product liability failure under the New 
Jersey Products Liability Act (PLA),306 focusing on the fact that 
the tool was designed in a defective manner.307 The court noted 
 
 301. In an additional case, Lamonte Mims allegedly murdered Edward 
French two weeks after he was released by a judge who relied on the Arnold 
Tool, despite Mr. Mims having been charged with possession of two guns and 
being on probation for burglary. Westervelt, supra note 67. The Pretrial 
Division Project of San Francisco Sheriff’s Office acknowledged that her staff 
mistakenly entered incorrect data for Mr. Mims, leading the product to give 
an incorrect score that the judge relied on for making a decision. See id. 
 302. Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL 
2429574, at *1 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019). 
 303. See id. 
 304. See id. For more details on Christian Rodgers’ death, see Joe 
Hernandez, Mother of Slain N.J. Man Blames Computer Program for His 
Shooting, WHYY.ORG (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/4Q57-NJTH. 
 305. See Rodgers, 2019 WL 2429574, at *1. “After the murder, the state 
Judiciary updated the algorithm to recommend preventative detention for 
anyone charged with serious gun crimes.” Hernandez, supra note 304. 
 306. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 2020). 
 307. The New Jersey statute states in part, that the product caused a harm 
not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it: 
a. deviated from the design specifications, formulae, or performance 
standards of the manufacturer or from otherwise identical units 
manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications or 
formulae, or 
b. failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or 
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the Restatement (Third) of Torts defined the presentencing 
assessment outside the term “product” under the New Jersey 
PLA, as the PSA was neither considered a tangible product 
distributed commercially for use or consumption nor a 
non-tangible “other item.”308 The PSA was seen as “information, 
guidance, ideas, and recommendations as to how to consider the 
risk a given criminal defendant presents.”309 The court also 
noted that under the First Amendment, information and 
guidance are not subject to tort liability as they are seen as 
speech instead of a product.310 In conclusion, the court also found 
a failure to establish proximate causation and the fact that the 
PSA omitted risk indicators of firearm possession and 
sex-crimes as the PSA is one of many pieces of different 
information that a judge takes into account.311 
Although in different positions, both Mr. Loomis and Ms. 
Rodgers found that their inability to access the algorithm and 
data used restricted their opportunities to be heard.312 As Part 
II of this paper described how AI is untrustworthy in leading 
decisions, there must be ways to protect a plaintiff’s potential 
tort remedies when there is no transparency of the algorithm. 
Eric Surette outlined in the article, “Liability of Businesses to 
Governments and Consumers for Breach of Data Security for 
 
c. was designed in a defective manner. 
Rodgers, 2019 WL 2429574, at *2 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 (West 
2020)). 
 308. See id. The Restatement (Third) of Torts would consider “non-tangible 
items such as ‘other items,’” to include services, human blood, and human 
tissues. Id. at *2 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
§ 19 (AM. L. INST. 1998)). 
 309. Id. at *3. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. The district court’s opinion was affirmed by Rodgers v. Christie, 
795 F. App’x 878 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 312. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760–64 (Wis. 2016) (finding the 
claim lacking because neither the inability to challenge “the scientific validity 
of the risk assessment” nor the inability to ensure that sentencing is “based on 
accurate information” violated due process); Rodgers, 2019 WL 2429574, at 
*2–3 (rendering Public Safety Assessments outside the scope of product 
liability, making it impossible for plaintiff to bring a claim). 
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Consumers’ Information,”313 data breach security concerns,314 
and this could provide a roadmap to connect data breaches in 
criminal justice software. Once the algorithms in the AI are 
made transparent, and if a data breach can be proven, plaintiffs 
can begin to prepare plausible causes of action.315 
2.  Legal Remedies for Wrongfully Convicted Criminal 
Defendants Impacted by Hacked Data 
Persons wrongfully convicted based on problematic AI 
should be permitted to use legal remedies similar to plaintiffs in 
tort cases who have been convicted by falsified data from human 
actors. The question is to determine if hacked data may be used 
to challenge a conviction or sentence. Cary Coglianese and 
David Lehr, in “Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era,” provide a strong 
rationale for why machine-learning should be used in 
administrative agencies.316 First, this is because delegating 
decision-making to machines is likely not prohibited by 
Congress/statutes.317 Coglianese and Lehr support 
machine-learning in administrative agencies because it is 
possible to use machine-learning without violating due process 
under the Fifth Amendment.318 They also note that 
machine-learning within administrative agencies will not be 
discriminatory, so long as those implementing it have employed 
 
 313. Surette, supra note 130. 
 314. Id. 
 315. See id.; In re Zappos.com, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-00325, 2013 WL 4830497 
(D. Nev. Sept. 9, 2013) (ordering that plaintiffs had standing for a data breach 
claim where they alleged that a data breach occurred and the information to 
prove this would be accessible to them). 
 316. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative 
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1154 
(2017). 
 317. See id. at 1178–84 
A Congress that deliberately contemplated and authorized an 
agency to use machine learning would presumably also understand 
the need to provide guidance about the necessary objective function 
for algorithms to optimize, and it would be more likely than usual 
to articulate a sufficiently clear set of goals that would pass the 
intelligibility muster. 
 318. Id. at 1184–91. 
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machine-learning in good faith.319 However, hackers do not act 
in good faith and are a well-known problem in the tech 
community.320 
The fact that a harmed person has no evidentiary 
mechanisms to question algorithmic accusers violates the intent 
of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.321 Adversarial 
machine-learning, code that has written itself, modified itself, 
and improved itself, with no indication where there might have 
been nefarious attacks to the code, withholds from defendants 
an opportunity to review the testimonial evidence against the 
accused. Andrea Roth has outlined the history of not allowing 
machines to testify.322 She warns against the unknown of “black 
box dangers” where human error and machine error can cause 
a machine to produce faulty outcomes.323 Potentially hacked 
data makes machine testimony even more of a necessity.324 The 
information needed is withheld because of a protected cloud 
server.325 The lack of privity between the harmed party 
(wrongfully convicted defendant or a third party) and the 
software company allows the state to flee from any 
 
 319. Id. at 1191–93. 
 320. Operating systems and software are full of undisclosed and 
undetermined vulnerabilities, whether because of software-hardware 
incompatibilities, leaving the products used open to cyberattacks and hacks. 
See supra Part I.C; Steve Symanovich, 5 Reasons Why General Software 
Updates and Patches Are Important, NORTON (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/XEW7-HJUP. 
 321. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Professor Roth outlines the history of the 
Confrontation Clause and its changing role with the rise of technology. See 
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2040–41 (2017). 
Coglianese observes that machine-learning could violate due process under the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. See 
Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 316, at 1184–85. 
 322. Roth, supra note 321, at 2043. 
 323. Professor Roth outlines the history of the radar detector. Id. at 
2015– 19. 
 324. See Zittrain, supra note 179 (discussing how AI’s inability to explain 
its reasoning makes it so “there’s no easy way to predict how it might fail when 
presented with specially crafted or corrupted data”). 
 325. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 316, at 1220 (“Agencies must 
properly and securely store these data to minimize threats to privacy 
intrusions, especially when many administrative applications of machine 
learning will require inter-agency sharing through the cloud.”). 
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responsibility.326 The federal government, the District of 
Columbia, and thirty-five states have compensation statutes for 
people who have been wrongfully convicted327 and this must be 
expanded to include victims who are wrongfully convicted based 
on faulty AI. 
Legal solutions using available tort remedies are currently 
limited as algorithms are classified as intangible property, like 
the information in books or media.328 This property is protected 
as trade secrets and confidential information, not products, so it 
does not permit persons harmed by AI-based products in the 
criminal justice system to access products liability.329 It is also 
challenging to access defamation, invasion of property, or breach 
of duty because of a lack of privity between the third-party 
software company and individuals impacted by the software, as 
the privity of contract is between the company and the state 
corrections or court system and potent indemnification clauses 
shield the company.330 
Once the plaintiff can show the AI generated a decision 
recommendation based on flawed data or a malfunctioning AI 
that violates Equal Protection, the plaintiff can file a cause of 
action against the software manufacturer or the state.331 
 
 326. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760–64 (Wis. 2016) 
(outlining why a defendant is unable to see the information contained inside 
the algorithm). 
 327. See Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://perma.cc/6DRC-2MKX (PDF). The following fifteen states do not: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, New Mexico, 
North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming. See id. 
 328. See Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL 
2429574, at *3 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019) (explaining why no remedy exists in tort 
law). 
 329. See Roth, supra note 321, at 2028 (“Creators of proprietary algorithms 
typically argue that the source code is a trade secret or that it is unnecessary 
to prepare a defense . . . . But it is not clear that trade secret doctrine would 
protect the source code of an algorithm used to convict or impose liability.”). 
 330. See Moellenberg et al., supra note 290 (recommending such contracts 
and indemnity clauses specifically to control the liability risk that comes along 
with using AI). 
 331. See Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 316, at 1191–205 (discussing, in 
the context of federal agencies, how an AI-generated decision could violate 
Equal Protection). 
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Scientists have studied the adversarial aspects of 
machine-learning for over a decade,332 so any software developer 
and customer should be aware of the potential risk in using the 
product. Where the flaw occurs should have no bearing on the 
plaintiff’s right of recovery, as the software developer sent a 
defective product into the industry. If the software company 
warned the municipality or court that it could not guarantee 
protected data, remedies might be arguably limited. The state 
should bear the burden of this error, not a wrongfully convicted 
person or wronged third party.333 Additionally, because of the 
way AI works,334 it is not reasonable for an indemnification 
clause in a contract to shield a company from civil liability, as it 
takes time to determine if the software has an error, typically at 
the risk of people serving prison sentences.335 Criminal 
defendants must be seen as customers of the court, as they, too, 
are members of the general public and deserve a route to bring 
forth a suit if their constitutional protections have been violated. 
Plaintiffs wrongfully convicted under flawed AI should also 
be able to access defamation and invasion of privacy causes of 
action depending on the extent of the conviction and on whether 
the conviction led to the termination of employment, impacted 
child custody decisions, or led to the loss of property or standing 
in the community. The CCPA permits private civil actions for 
 
 332. Kegelmeyer, supra note 70, at 10, 12. See generally Amir Globerson & 
Sam Roweis, Nightmare at Test Time: Robust Learning by Feature Deletion, in 
ICML 2006: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23RD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
MACHINE LEARNING 353–60 (2006), https://perma.cc/EJ8D-3CVQ. 
 333. Many scholars have focused on how companies can protect themselves 
from this potential lawsuit through more carefully crafted contracts to shield 
them from civil liability whether they design the AI or have incorporated 
another product into their own. See generally Emily Garrison et al., Artificial 
Intelligence: The New Frontier for Assessing Insurance Coverage, 
POLICYHOLDER PERSP. (June 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/TX7B-TLYF; Artificial 
Intelligence Liability—Don’t Overlook Your Risk, HUB INT’L (Oct. 11, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/9PBE-96C9. 
 334. The INTRODUCTION discusses the multiple parties involved in a single 
artificial intelligence system. See Watson, supra note 29, at 80. 
 335. Once the AI software is up and running, the developer will insist on 
the end-user essentially signing a contract to say the software meets the 
specifications set out at the beginning of development. See Michael Carson & 
Greg McEwen, Artificial Intelligence Misdiagnosis: Who Is to Blame?, LAW. 
MONTHLY, https://perma.cc/E3RM-P7R3 (last updated July 3, 2019). 
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data breaches only; these are statutory damages for not less 
than $100 to $750 per consumer per incident or actual damages 
if the company failed to implement reasonable data security.336 
One of the latest examples of a securities class action 
lawsuit arising out of a data breach or other cybersecurity and 
AI incident, on October 24, 2019, a plaintiff shareholder filed a 
securities class action lawsuit against California-based software 
company Zendesk after fifteen thousand Zendesk Support and 
Chat accounts had been accessed without authorized 
permission.337 Additionally, it is not unheard of for civil actions 
to be brought forward in this manner. In In re Adobe Systems, 
Inc. Privacy Litigation,338 the plaintiffs were customers of a 
software retailer whose computer systems were hacked, 
resulting in the exposure of the customers’ personal 
information.339 The customers alleged that the software retailer 
did not maintain “reasonable security practices” to protect 
customer data, in violation of California Civil Code Section 
1798.81.5(b).340 
3.  Legal Remedies for Third Parties Injured Due to Flawed 
Data or Algorithms 
A victim harmed by a person wrongfully released due to 
flawed data in the criminal justice system should also have legal 
remedies available, either through the state or the software 
 
 336. Kristin Madigan, Data Privacy: California, GDPR, in ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS NATIONAL INSTITUTE 475 (2020), 
https://perma.cc/DYC8-B8ZB (PDF); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.150(a)(1), 
(a)(1)(A) (West 2021). 
 337. See Kevin LaCroix, Zendesk Hit with Data Breach-Related Securities 
Suit, D&O DIARY (Oct. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/3T5V-TA3X; see also Beyer 
v. Symantec Corp., No. 18-cv-02006, 2019 WL 935135, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 
2019) (claiming that Symantec failed to update an open source code “for at 
least seven years, resulting in critical vulnerabilities” in the products that 
plaintiffs had purchased); Diaz v. Intuit Inc., No. 15-cv-01778, 2017 WL 
4355075, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017) (claiming Intuit knowingly allowed 
fraudsters to file returns by maintaining lax security measures); Diaz v. Intuit, 
Inc., No. 15-cv-01778, 2018 WL 2215790, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2018) 
(same). 
 338. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 339. Id. at 1207. 
 340. Id. at 1210. 
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company. One cause of action could be negligence. The first step 
would have to assess if the state owed a duty to protect the 
victim.341 The standard of reasonable care extends to foreseeable 
plaintiffs for foreseeable harm.342 As for foreseeable plaintiffs, 
an argument could be made that a person who has been released 
from prison could foreseeably harm another. The state and the 
software developer should foresee that hacked or hackable AI in 
a product used in criminal courts could lead to a dangerous 
defendant being released and harm to the general public. This 
is what happened to Christian Rodgers when Jules Black was 
released and allegedly killed Rodgers.343 However, this is a very 
fact-specific analysis. It can be based on biased rationales, 
harkening to historical myths of people of color being more likely 
to engage in criminal behavior.344 
It is foreseeable that software can be hacked. The threat of 
hacked AI or insecure data is so concerning to corporations that 
there has been a concerted effort to reinforce legal protections 
through indemnification clauses between the developer, the 
manufacturer, and the customer (the state).345 The question 
arises regarding what type of data error (leading to AI error) 
would lead to potential liability. If the data is flawed (as in found 
data sets), there may be no liability, as this may not be 
considered foreseeable within the duty of care, or it may be 
considered a causal break in a factual causation analysis, or 
could be seen as too far removed in a proximate causation 
 
 341. See Dimick v. Hopkinson, 422 P.3d 512, 521 (Wyo. 2018) (“The 
elements of negligence are well known: ‘(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a 
duty to conform to a specified standard of care; (2) the defendant breached the 
duty of care; (3) the breach proximately caused injury to the plaintiff; and (4) 
the injury is compensable by money damages.’” (quoting Brown v. Big Horn 
Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 3,388 P.3d 542, 546–47 (Wyo. 2017))). 
 342. See Johnson v. A/S Ivarans Rederi, 613 F.2d 334, 351 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(labeling an action as negligent where it was foreseeable that an employee 
would use the dangerous area in the course of their work). 
 343. See Rodgers v. Laura & John Arnold Found., No. 17-5556, 2019 WL 
2429574, at *4 (D.N.J. June 11, 2019) (noting that Black’s generated Public 
Safety Assessment score influenced his release). 
 344. See generally Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit 
Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 292 (2008). 
 345. See Moellenberg et al., supra note 290 (recommending the use of 
“contractual warranties, indemnities, and limitations to control liability risk”). 
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analysis. However, there might be a different analysis to know 
if hacked data could create a path to liability. 
Another path a plaintiff might pursue is product liability. 
Typically, a plaintiff would have access to sue a software 
company if the software proved defective.346 However, the courts 
and the criminal justice systems are the entities that have 
privity of contract.347 There is no privity of contract between the 
potential civil plaintiffs who are also the criminal defendants. 
Whether products liability claims can be pursued and by whom 
will depend on the terms of the contract, which will often provide 
indemnification to the software company for logical fallacies in 
the code.348 Also, the lack of privity between the software 
company and the third party can bar claims.349 While the 
software company will have a contract with the court system, 
there are often indemnification clauses in the contract that will 
protect the software company from any liability that a third 
party might face.350 Equity and fairness require that third 
parties be able to recover when harmed by hacked algorithms 
used in court. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING UNTRUSTWORTHY AI 
Hacking by nefarious actors is a true threat to criminal 
justice reform. Without revolutionary efforts, there will be no 
justice. Lack of scrutiny will cause further disparities in the 
Black community, communities of color, and low-socioeconomic 
individuals.351 There must also be hyper-vigilance in monitoring 
 
 346. See, e.g., Wendorf v. JLG Indus., Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010) (alleging a software defect associated with a machine’s controls). 
 347. See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Wis. 2016) (discussing 
how a private company designed COMPAS to support the Department of 
Corrections, a part of the state, “when making placement decisions, managing 
offenders, and planning treatment”). 
 348. See Moellenberg et al., supra note 290 (arguing for more 
indemnification clauses and greater protection for software companies). 
 349. See, e.g., Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 387 (Ariz. 
1981) (holding that lack of privity will preclude recovery in the case of some 
warranties). 
 350. See Moellenberg, supra note 290. 
 351. See Barry Friedman, Opinion, The Worrisome Future of Policing 
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/F78C-RUBP 
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the creation, distribution, and manipulation of training sets to 
guard against cyberattacks. Finally, it is time for 
machine-learning algorithms to be redefined as tangible 
property so plaintiffs can access product liability causes of action 
due to faulty product design. 
A.  Hacking Will Have a Disproportionate Impact on Black 
Communities in the Criminal Justice System 
Black communities are disproportionately represented in 
the criminal justice system for reasons that have little to do with 
crime. Every jurisdiction is permitted by statute, regulation, 
political will, or common practice to maintain records on policing 
as they see fit.352 There is no nationwide database on death at 
the hands of the police, records of arrests, detention, length of 
detention, plea bargains, sentencing, incarceration lengths, or 
the demographics of any of the deceased, defendants, or 
victims.353 At best, studies rely on estimates, and those numbers 
paint a grim picture.354 The Bureau of Justice Statistics found 
that from June 2015 through March 2016, on average, there was 
an arrest-related death rate of four-per-day (the 1,348 deaths 
BJS acknowledged did not include the deaths under federal or 
tribal law enforcement).355 The number of Black people harmed 
by manipulated algorithms will dwarf all historical records, and 
the gravity of harm is incomprehensible. 
 
(“Whether written by humans or a product of machine learning, algorithms 
take past facts and magnify them into future police actions. Much of street 
policing in recent years . . . has been deployed disproportionately against 
minorities and in poor neighborhoods.”). 
 352. See, e.g., National Use-of-Force Data Collection, FED. BUREAU 
INVESTIGATION, https://perma.cc/7WJK-KMX4 (explaining that participation 
in this collection of use of force data is open to any jurisdiction but still 
voluntary). 
 353. Rob Picheta & Henrik Pettersson, American Police Shoot, Kill and 
Imprison More People than Other Developed Countries. Here’s the Data, CNN 
(June 8, 2020, 7:13 AM), https://perma.cc/7MV6-9QPU. 
 354. See id. (“If every US state were counted as a country, the 31 countries 
with the highest incarceration rates in the world would all be US states, 
according to the Prison Policy Initiative.”). 
 355. See id. 
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Charlon McIlwain, author of Black Software: The Internet 
& Racial Justice, From the AfroNet to Black Lives Matter,356 tells 
the story of three civil rights-era leaders.357 Those leaders 
foresaw the complexities of race, racism, and technology.358 
McIlwain describes how A. Philip Randolph (“the philosopher”), 
Bayard Rustin (“the planner”), and Roy Wilkins (“the visionary”) 
traced how computing and automation could handily further 
mask inequalities with shallow capitulation by the people.359 
These men saw the future. Race, racial intent, and racial 
disparities are so rooted in the code, so pervasive, and so fraught 
with foregone conclusions, that it is poor design not to have 
unpacked the racialized exacerbation that occurs from code 
design.360 A model following a “burden-shifting test” can help 
mitigate the harms.361 
Questions to be raised are several: “Is the model fair? Does 
the model have a valid business justification? Are there 
alternative models that are fairer, but maintain reasonable 
predictive ability?”362 Intentional design will help stop further 
disparities. 
 
 356. CHARLTON MCILWAIN, BLACK SOFTWARE: THE INTERNET & RACIAL 
JUSTICE, FROM THE AFRONET TO BLACK LIVES MATTER (2019). 
 357. Charlton McIlwain, The Three Civil Rights-Era Leaders Who Warned 
of Computers and Racism, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2020, 5:50 AM), 
https://perma.cc/D3ZY-NGXL. 
 358. See generally id. 
 359. Dr. McIlwain calls A. Phillip Randolph the chief ethicist who believed 
public interest should direct technological creation, Bayard Rustin, the social 
engineer, who outlined technological governance and a need for the people to 
be trained for employment, and Roy Wilkins, the visionary, who foresaw a 
future where computers would be trained to catalog racist ideologies. Id. 
 360. “Algorithms don’t have to look at race to be racist.” Friedman, supra 
note 351. PredPol, another algorithm was without a way to correct racial bias, 
leading to data that did no more than intensify bias. See Griffard, supra note 
5, at 51 (citing Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 
SIGNIFICANCE 16–17 (2016)). 
 361. See Nicholas Schmidt, Ethical Algorithms & How Attorneys Can Save 
Us from Biased AI, CONSILIENCEML (Feb. 19, 2020), https://perma.cc/VP4P-
XN5U (PDF). 
 362. Id.; see Nicholas Schmidt, Ethical Algorithms: Fixing Discriminatory 
Machine Learning and Biased AI, in MASTERCLASS: UNDERSTANDING MACHINE 
LEARNING 62, 72 (2020), https://perma.cc/RAW6-S7TD (PDF); Lum, supra note 
247, at 8 (“[A] pretrial risk assessment instrument must be developed with 
community input, revalidated regularly by independent data scientists with 
TECHNOLOGICAL TETHEREDS 715 
 
Appreciating that the machines are designed to replicate 
human behaviors reminds us that the biases in human nature 
are embedded in the algorithms. It is also foreseeable to 
anticipate that nefarious actors will use adversarial 
machine-learning to entwine falsehoods into actual data and 
outputs. The New York Police Department uses software it 
expects to produce models that obfuscate race and gender data 
and other potential proxies for sensitive data.363 However, even 
this product has raised serious civil rights and civil liberties 
issues because of how the software can exacerbate disparities.364 
If a designer can create AI, then a designer can create fair 
AI.365 Teaching and developing an explicitly anti-racist code of 
conduct for AI designers that also monitors for anti-Blackness 
in the code will provide a start to addressing the issue of 
hacking. The first complexity is defining fairness. Lack of 
conditional parity across the entire group defines discrimination 
in the code, and machine-learning experts and practitioners 
must continue to implement fairness in the code and during 
quality control checks.366 “Explainable AI,” designed in the last 
five years, gives a model for making the software transparent.367 
Understanding the reasons hackers attack systems will help 
 
that input in mind, and subjected to regular, meaningful oversight by the 
community.”). 
 363. See Griffard, supra note 5, at 45 (“‘Patternizr is a new, effective, and 
fair recommendation engine . . . [that] when used properly, encourage[s] 
precision policing approaches instead of widespread, heavy-handed 
enforcement techniques.’”). 
 364. See id. (“[C]onsider whether the developers’ goal to build a bias-free 
predictive policing tool is actually achievable given the limitations of its 
inputs—racially-biased historic criminal justice data—and its users humans 
with the potential for errors and cognitive biases.”). For additional ideas, see 
generally Nicole Turner Lee et al., The Role of AI in the Criminal Justice 
System (Living with AI: The Human Impacts of AI Symposium, June 11, 2020), 
https://perma.cc/DAK5-9G6T [hereinafter Role of AI in the Criminal Justice 
System]. 
 365. See Henk Griffioen, Fairness in Machine Learning with PyTorch, GO 
DATA DRIVEN (May 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/3J6Y-BGPY. 
 366. See id. 
 367. See Schmidt, supra note 362; Richard Tomsett, Explainable AI (XAI), 
in MASTERCLASS: UNDERSTANDING MACHINE LEARNING 33–61 (2020), 
https://perma.cc/RAW6-S7TD (PDF). 
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train developers to create ways to combat criminal justice 
algorithm assaults better. 
B.  There Must Be Stronger Oversight of AI Used in Criminal 
Justice 
Regulation ensures that the use, distribution, and adoption 
of innovative technologies are serving society’s best interests.368 
Security and privacy of the internet network, data rights, and 
protection must be carefully monitored. Data gathering has 
been used as a tool to disempower people.369 As users will be 
profiled, analyzed, and considered a quantifiable output before 
they can act, processes must ensure that an algorithmic 
proposed output is not considered determinative.370 Scientists 
have also determined that algorithms that are more transparent 
and straightforward perform with the same accuracy as the 
COMPAS algorithm.371 If there are higher accuracy and 
 
 368. See Schwab, supra note 25, at 69–78. It is even anticipated that 
something as routine as census gathering can be accomplished through Big 
Data sources. Id. at 144. Schwab outlines the governance principles that 
should be followed during an era of market disruption. Though security and 
privacy are listed, they serve as the foundation as none of the disruption can 
be considered forward-moving if it is not correct, transparent, and accountable. 
Id. at 72. 
 369. See Tim Elfrink, Once-Secret Files from Gerrymandering Strategist 
Show GOP Misled Court, Watchdog Group Claims, WASH. POST (June 7, 2019, 
5:01 AM), https://perma.cc/B7XU-55MU (discussing the impact of racial data 
on gerrymandering). 
 370. The question has been asked, “How do we maintain our individuality, 
the source of our diversity and democracy, in the digital age?” Schwab, supra 
note 25, at 100. This question is being unpacked by philosophers, attorneys, 
theologians, and coders across the world. 
 371. See Yong, supra note 225 (“[T]his training-wheels algorithm could 
perform just as well as COMPAS, with an accuracy of 67 percent, even when 
using just two pieces of data—a defendant’s age, and their number of previous 
convictions.”). However, transparent algorithms may not lead to an 
explanation that will assist a plaintiff in court. See generally Lilian Edwards 
& Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is 
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18 
(2018); Elaine Angelino et al., Learning Certifiably Optimal Rule Lists for 
Categorical Data, J. MACH. LEARNING RSCH. 18(234) (2018), 
https://perma.cc/WHN5-3XK7; Robin A. Smith, Opening the Lid on Criminal 
Sentencing Software, DUKE TODAY (July 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/MX4Z-
V6NE. 
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transparent products available, they should be used. Scientists, 
states, and Congress will then have a better model to follow in 
creating new tech. 
Companies must produce a framework for every stage in 
this process to ensure accountability, including audits, and 
impact statements. Scientists and developers must continue to 
train datasets to measure intended variables, quantify and 
mitigate bias in statistical models, and not conflate multiple 
distinct predictions.372 Social scientists and lawyers must be 
incorporated in the software design process to ensure public 
policy goals are reflected in the tools and are reproducible for 
court challenges.373 There can be the creation of source code on 
places like GitHub,374 designed using adversarial 
machine-learning to check for equal protection violations in 
code. For example, Bnh.ai, a law firm dedicated to legal issues 
related to AI and analytics,375 has outlined ten questions an 
organization should answer in gauging liability related to the 
use of AI.376 Questions such as “how are your organization’s 
models audited for security or privacy vulnerabilities” and “does 
your company have response plans in place to address AI/ML 
incidents” of attacks or failures, can guide government systems 
that decide what types of AI to use.377 It can also help map 
whether they have correctly and thoroughly thought through all 
implications of deploying the software.378 
Every state and jurisdiction must do a complete and 
thorough inventory of algorithms that are in use in their 
 
 372. See PARTNERSHIP ON AI, REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
TOOLS IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16, 18, 22 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/C9K3-FR56 (PDF). 
 373. See Role of AI in the Criminal Justice System, supra note 364; 
PARTNERSHIP ON AI, supra note 372, at 27–28, 30. 
 374. See Georgios Gousios et al., Lean GHTorrent: GitHub Data on 
Demand, MSR 2014: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH WORKING CONFERENCE ON 
MINING SOFTWARE REPOSITORIES 384 (2014), https://perma.cc/HH8X-GZSZ 
(PDF). 
 375. Seth Colander, Bnh.ai Is a New Law Firm Focused Only on AI, 
VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 19, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/KR7C-VJK7. 
 376. BNH.AI, TEN QUESTIONS ON AI RISK, https://perma.cc/Q2MJ-5Y2J 
(PDF). 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
718 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 647 (2021) 
 
criminal justice system, cataloging companies, software, and 
data sources. If a state does not make its algorithms 
transparent, it must monitor and process PRAIs used. States 
should ensure that found data is accurate, show due diligence in 
reviewing the data, see if created data has been manipulated, 
and provide the public with a clear understanding of the limits 
of the technology, beyond even the five warnings presented in 
Loomis. AI developers, states, corrections departments, and 
judges should query software and algorithms used in the 
criminal system, principally looking for the ways AI perpetuates 
bias, the properties of algorithms necessary to mitigate AI bias, 
and the five places to review for bias in the algorithmic guideline 
process.379 If it is evident that AI outcomes further exacerbate 
racial disparities, it must immediately be removed from the 
decision-making process by law enforcement, district attorneys, 
judges, and parole boards. 
Federal studies and reform efforts must be unrestrained 
and directed towards genuine reform. Congressional AI studies 
must be completed with the input of privacy advocates, scholars, 
and scientists to counter the outsized influence of tech 
lobbyists.380 According to quarterly reports filed with Congress, 
Carnegie Mellon University was the only organization to 
 
 379. They must know who collects the data, how the algorithm is trained, 
how it works, how it will be used, how it will be used to understand the 
feedback loop and how new outcomes influence the next phase of the software. 
See generally Steven D. Pearson et al., Is Consensus Reproducible? A Study of 
an Algorithmic Guidelines Development Process, 33 MED. CARE 643 (1995). 
 380. See Growing Artificial Intelligence Through Research Act, H.R. 2202, 
116th Cong. (2019) (“[R]equir[ing] certain federal activities related to artificial 
intelligence, including implementation by the President of a National Artificial 
Intelligence Initiative.”); Countering Online Harms Act, H.R. 6937, 116th 
Cong. (2019) (requiring the Federal Trade Commission to conduct a study on 
artificial intelligence, and other purposes); GAINS Act, H.R. 6950, 116th Cong. 
(2019) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce and the Federal Trade 
Commission to conduct a study on artificial intelligence, and other purposes); 
AI JOBS Act of 2019, H.R. 827, 116th Cong. (2019) (promoting a 21st-century 
artificial intelligence workforce); Financial Transparency Act of 2019, H.R. 
4476, 116th Cong. (2019) (“[R]equir[ing] federal financial regulatory agencies 
to adopt specified data standards with respect to format, searchability, and 
transparency.”); see also David McCabe, How Tech’s Lobbyists Are Using the 
Pandemic to Make Gains, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/YZ3Q-
UXR4 (discussing the tech industry’s efforts to lobby the federal government 
to adopt more cloud-based services). 
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disclose “artificial intelligence” as a federal lobbying issue in 
2015.381 Product liability and other liability issues will soon be 
subject to more lawsuits, and there should be a federal answer 
to protect people harmed by AI.382 On November 17, 2020, the 
U.S. Office of Management released its final guidance on the 
regulation of AI, following a February 2019 executive order.383 
Executive Order 13859, “Maintaining American Leadership in 
Artificial Intelligence,”384 provides a risk-based approach that 
prioritizes stronger protections for AI systems that show a 
potential for higher risk with a focus on economic growth, but is 
seen as not balanced with an understanding of AI harms.385 The 
White House AI Regulatory guidance recognizes a distinction 
between private sector AI regulation and governments 
deploying AI systems,386 but without a clear acknowledgement 
that private sector third-party software used in government 
 
 381. Gopal Ratnam & Kate Ackley, Artificial Intelligence Is Coming. Will 
Congress Be Ready?, ROLL CALL (June 10, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://perma.cc/8NWK-VHHE. 
 382. See id. (“[O]paque automated advertising systems driven by 
algorithms could perpetuate discrimination and avoid 
scrutiny . . . . Tech-savvy lawmakers say Congress must be better educated 
before passing legislation addressing artificial intelligence to avoid repeating 
the failures made with earlier internet technologies.”); Chris Opfer, AI Hiring 
Could Mean Robot Discrimination Will Head to Courts, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 
12, 2019, 6:01 AM), https://perma.cc/XU88-3DKZ (“The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission is already investigating at least two cases involving 
claims that algorithms unlawfully excluded certain groups of workers during 
the recruitment process, and seven attorneys told Bloomberg Law it’s just a 
matter of time until courts are asked to weigh in on similar arguments.”). 
 383. See Alex Engler, New White House Guidance Downplays Important 
AI Harms, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/44GL-58W8 
(citing Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019)). This 
executive order directed the federal government to develop five branches for 
furthering AI: “(1) invest in AI research and development (R&D), (2) unleash 
AI resources, (3) remove barriers to AI innovation, (4) train an AI-ready 
workforce, and (5) promote an international environment that is supportive of 
American AI innovation and its responsible use.” Artificial Intelligence for the 
American People, WHITE HOUSE, https://perma.cc/MV2V-5CVJ. 
 384. Russel Vought, Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence 
Applications, WHITE HOUSE (Nov. 17, 2020), https://perma.cc/84WQ-JHNJ. 
 385. See Engler, supra note 383 (“[T]here is a real risk that this document 
becomes a force for maintaining the status quo, as opposed to addressing 
serious AI harms.”). 
 386. Id. 
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systems is happening, this will not achieve the effect of proper 
regulation. Additionally, the guidance states “Agencies should 
consider new regulation only . . . in light of the foregoing 
section . . . that Federal Regulation is necessary.”387 Engler 
notes that without modernized enforcement processes, the 
current system allows mechanisms to circumvent the law using 
algorithms.388 This was attempted recently by Housing and 
Urban Development when it attempted to implement a new rule 
that made it impossible for a plaintiff to prove they were 
discriminated against by an algorithm.389 It is unknown what 
will change with the Biden administration’s policies on AI.390 
 
 387. See id. (quoting VOUGHT, supra note 384, at 2). 
 388. Id. 
 389. See Elizabeth Fernandez, Will Machine Learning Algorithms Erase 
the Progress of the Fair Housing Act?, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/YBX7-9B2Z (“[T]he proposal drastically limits the recourse of 
those who feel that they have been discriminated against—so much so that it 
may be impossible to show discrimination existed.”). The Interdisciplinary 
Working Group on Algorithmic Justice—a group of ten computer scientists, 
legal scholars, and social scientists from the Santa Fe Institute and the 
University of New Mexico—submitted a formal response to this proposal that 
articulated how algorithms in housing applications may be inherently biased 
against certain groups of people. Letter from Sonia Gipson Rankin et al., The 
Interdisciplinary Working Grp. on Algorithmic Just., to Off. of the Gen. 
Couns., Rules Docket Clerk, Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. (Oct. 18, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/EH7Q-PBD3 (PDF). On October 25, 2020, the United States 
District Court of Massachusetts issued a preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the proposed HUD rule. Memorandum and Order Regarding 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 to Postpone 
the Effective Date of HUD’S Unlawful New Rule, Mass. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., (No. 20-11765) (D. Mass. Oct. 25, 2020), 2020 WL 
6390143. 
 390. See Engler, supra note 383 (“It is hard to imagine that changing this 
guidance is going to be a leading priority of the Biden White House, given all 
its other pressing problems.”). The National Security Commission on Artificial 
Intelligence—which includes executives from Microsoft, Amazon Web, and 
Google—submitted a 756-page report to President Biden and Congress laying 
out their vision for “winning the AI era.” NAT’L SEC. COMM’N ON ARTIFICIAL 
INTEL., FINAL REPORT (2021), https://perma.cc/7GSU-Y3T2 (PDF). 
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C.  Legal Remedies Are Needed for Parties Harmed by Data 
Hacks in Criminal Justice Risk Assessment Instruments 
The use of AI through criminal justice risk assessment 
instruments cements harm to defendants, victims, and stifles 
the administration of justice. What Apple and United Health did 
by failing to protect women and Black Americans is already 
contrary to established Equal Protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.391 These constitutional violations beg the question: 
why did the algorithm not scan for violations against protected 
classes when deployed? And if a judge consults a risk 
assessment instrument and the tool is also violating the Equal 
Protection, the decision must be allowed review. 
Tort remedies also provide the traditional means of shifting 
all or part of the economic and non-economic loss from one entity 
to another due to harm caused by misconduct, deliberately or 
through inattention.392 The functions and goals of negligence 
law are to deter unsafe activities, compensate injured victims, 
encourage economic growth and progress, and improve 
effectiveness, efficiency in legal administration, and fairness.393 
Scholars have noted the limitations because the limits of tort 
law remain undefined, and potentially hacked criminal justice 
data is a legitimate concern every plaintiff should raise. In 
Bauserman v. Unemployment Insurance Agency,394 the court 
noted that the case was remanded so that a cognizable 
constitutional tort claim could be identified.395 Resident Fellow 
 
 391. The superintendent of the New York Department of Financial 
Services, Linda Lacewell said, “Any algorithm, that intentionally or not results 
in discriminatory treatment of women or any other protected class of people 
violates New York law.” Sridhar Natarajan & Shahien Nasiripour, Viral Tweet 
About Apple Card Leads to Goldman Sachs Probe, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 9, 
2019), https://perma.cc/53TS-B6E2. A letter to UnitedHealth by the 
Department of Financial Services and Department of Health outlined that 
“New York Insurance Law, the New York Human Rights Law, the New York 
General Business Law, and the federal Civil Rights Act all protect against 
discrimination for protected classes of individuals.” Letter from Linda 
Lacewell, supra note 161. 
 392. See DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2020). 
 393. See id. at 13. 
 394. 950 N.W.2d 446 (Mich. Ct. App. 2019). 
 395. Id. 
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of Yale’s Information Society Project, Anat Lior, author of the 
article, AI Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability 
and the AI Respondeat Superior Analogy,396 advocates for the 
adoption and application of a strict liability regime on current 
and future AI accidents, by delving into and exploring the realm 
of legal analogies in the AI context, thereby promoting the 
agency analogy, and subsequently, the respondeat superior 
doctrine.397 And in The AI Accident Network: Artificial 
Intelligence Liability Meets Network Theory,398 Lior argues for a 
way to integrate network theory into the field of AI tort law 
presenting a new methodology about the appropriate liability 
regime that should apply when AI causes damages.399 In Civil 
Liability for Artificial Intelligence: What Should its Basis Be?,400 
scholar Jean-Sébastien Borghetti outlines that AI used in 
different fields can be addressed through particular liability 
regimes, whether strict liability or general liability.401 To protect 
liberty and fairness, the definition of product liability must 
identify AI and algorithms as falling within the definition of a 
 
 396. Anat Lior, AI Entities as AI Agents: Artificial Intelligence Liability 
and the AI Respondeat Superior Analogy, 46 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1043, 
1043 (2020) 
This article explains why the agency analogy is the best-suited one 
in contrast to other analogies that have been suggested in the 
context of AI liability (e.g., products, animals, electronic persons, 
and even slaves). As a result, the intuitive application of the 
respondeat superior doctrine provides the AI industry with a 
much-needed underlying liability regime that will enable it to 
continue to evolve in the years to come, and its victim to receive 
remedy once accidents occur. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Anat Lior, The AI Accident Network: Artificial Intelligence Liability 
Meets Network Theory, 95 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021). 
 399. Id. 
 400. Jean-Sébastien Borghetti, Civil Liability for Artificial Intelligence: 
What Should Its Basis Be?, 17 LA REVUE DES JURISTES DE SCIENCES PO 94 
(2019). 
 401. Id. The harm caused by autonomous vehicles, for example, is probably 
better addressed through strict liability regimes for traffic accidents through 
a general liability for the AI regime. See Charikleia Bertsia, Legal Liability of 
Artificial Intelligence-Driven Systems (AI), INT’L HELLENIC UNIV. (2019), 
https://perma.cc/KE59-2U5U (PDF) (analyzing the Product Liability regime in 
the European Union to determine whether it suitably addresses issues raised 
by increasing AI usage). 
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product and not just the final software. The Third Restatement 
of Torts must also define AI and machine-learning algorithms 
as a product. As it took time to define harm by any product, 
harm by hacking and cybercrimes, though complex, must be 
given space for redress by victims. These steps can provide 
wrongly convicted persons and other victims recourse under the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
If there is oversight, AI can increase fairness in the criminal 
justice system. Else, failure to ensure the validity of AI-based 
products will lead to extinguishing liberty interests enshrined 
in the Constitution. United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., set the nation on course with his 
understanding of this principle, in his oft-cited observation: 
“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.”402 
AI is how we will rewrite society’s rules, and how we will 
explain, defend, and refine the Constitution. It is time for the 
law to be forward-thinking in protecting people from potential 
harms of AI, whether it has been weaponized or has entered the 
public sphere without proper scrutiny. Achieving fairness is a 
lofty and necessary goal, but cementing disparate outcomes will 
decelerate justice’s evolution. 
Ernest Rutherford, the “father of nuclear physics,” said, 
“[y]ou should never bet against anything in science at odds of 
more than about 10-12 to 1 against.”403 Most Americans support 
policies that restrict the scope of autonomous technologies. Yet 
society is beyond this moment and cannot, nor should it, go 
backward. One day, AI will mimic only the most optimal 
principles and protocols of human nature. It will show that 
humans strive to be filled with compassion, justice, and fairness. 
It will not show greed and bias, nor will it exacerbate superficial 
 
 402. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). “The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of 
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share 
with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in 
determining the rules by which men should be governed.” Id. 
 403. RICHARD J. LIPTON, THE P=NP QUESTION AND GÖDEL’S LOST LETTER, 
viii (2010). 
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or historical errors and harms. This aim propels researchers 
forward to augment human decision points with AI. There is a 
need for the systems to protect privacy, offer transparency, and 
purposely require software developers and states that use this 
technology to ensure it is serving the public. These public policy 
concerns will rebut many established torts, contracts, and 
patent laws and principles. The technology illuminates flaws 
and inequities that have always been in the system. Because of 
the exponential speed of technology, legal systems have not kept 
up with the rate of change. New principles must ensure at a 
minimum that there are no further inequities created in the 
system. Social justice must ensure that rational thought is not 
being manipulated to perform as the machine would.404 If not 
careful, mindful, and vigilant, history will find humankind 
responding as an algorithm would rather than ensuring the 
human spirit and capacity to improve is captured in the 
technology. 405 Now is the time to use AI to devise a society 
without the historic human errors of bias. 
Noted anti-lynching advocate, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, 
posited, “The way to right wrongs is to turn the light of truth 
upon them.”406 Transparency is vital to safeguarding equity 
through design and must be the first step. If an algorithm is 
used in the criminal justice system and has been hacked, it is a 
defective product that harms everyone. Tort law must rapidly 
adapt to allow plaintiffs theories of accountability and liability 
through tort reform under state and federal law. The goal is to 
understand our biases and work with them, rather than hide 
from them. AI in criminal justice will need law and tech to 
reduce biases, improve justice, and achieve fairness. 
 
 
 404. See FOER, supra note 24, at 77 (“That’s why Facebook has so few 
qualms about performing rampant experiments on its users. The whole effort 
is to make human beings predictable—to anticipate their behavior, which 
makes them easier to manipulate.”); id. at 220 (“Machines are increasingly 
suggesting the most popular topics for human inquiry, and humans are 
increasingly obeying.”). 
 405. Oscar Wilde wrote in his 1889 essay, The Decay of Lying that “Life 
imitates Art far more than Art imitates Life.” OSCAR WILDE, THE DECAY OF 
LYING 10 (1891). 
 406. LORI AMBER ROSSENER ET AL., POLITICAL PIONEER OF THE PRESS 117 
(2018). 
